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Kenne~y cone & diss)

v.
BLACKFEET INDIANS

1.

SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

CA9

Timely

~

s~ruelt

aeWfl state taxes on production from

tribal mineral leases.
2.

v

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

General Allotment Act.

In 1887, Congress enacted the

Designed to facilitate speedy

assimilation, the Act allotted parcels of land to individual
Indians.
during

CVSG-D~

The parcels were to be held in trust for a time · ·-

3

-~-

Indian would become the owner in fee.

The Act was amended in

1891 to permit short term leases of unallotted lands and lands
allotted to aged and disabled allottees.

Provisions for leasing

were gradually liberalized over the years, culminating in
of May 29, 1924.

the~ct

That Act allowed oil and gas production leases

for "as long as oil or gas shall be found in paying quantities,"
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to extend previous
leases, and, most important, authorized state taxation of mineral
production.

Proceeds from the leases were paid to the Secretary

and disbursed by congressional appropriation for the benefit of
the Indians.l
In

the ~id-30s,

Congress decided that the whole allotment

approach had been wronghead.

The Indian Reorganization Act

I

(IRA), passed in 1934, prohibited further allotment, returned to
the Tribes some of the land that had passed into non-Indian
ownership, and made provisions for tribal autonomy and authority

lThe Act provided:
[U]nallotted land on Indian reservations ... may be
leased at public auction by the Secretary of the
Interior, with the consent of the council speaking for
such Indians, for oil and gas mining purposes for a
period of not to exceed ten years, and as much longer
thereafter as oil or gas shall be found in paying
quantities, and the terms of any existing oil and gas
mining lease may in like manner be amended by extending
the term thereof for as long as oil or gas shall be
found in paying quantities: Provided, That the
production of oil and gas and other mineral on such
lands may be taxed by the State in which said lands are
located in all respects the same as production on
unrestricted lands, and the Secretary of the Interior
is hereby authorized and directed to cause to be paid
the tax so assessed against the royalty interests on
said lands.

-.J-

(.

over tribal lands.

After

~ eral

years of further debate,

Congress passed the Act of May 11, 1938, to "bring all mineralleasing matters in harmony with the Indian Reorganization Act."
The 1938 Act put in place a comprehemsive scheme for mineral
leasing of unallotted lands.

(All of resp's minerals are

technically "unallotted lands" because the minerals were reserved
to the United States for the benefit of the Tribe when the
reservation land was allotted.)

The Act provided for leases to

be sold at auction to the highest bidder by the Indians
themselves, though with the approval of the Secretary and under
regulations issued by him.

The 1938 Act did not mention

taxation: it did repeal "all Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent
herewith."

(

/31...~

Resp~as entered into 125 leases with non-Indian oil and gas
producers. Twelve of the leases were made under the authority ·of
the 1924 Act, the remainder pursuant to the 1938 Act.

Petr (5~ej

levies a variety of taxes on oil and gas produced under the
leases.

~~~

The taxes are actually paid by the lessees, who reduce

their royalty payments to resp accordingly.

There is some

dispute over what portion, if any, of the legal incidence of the
taxes

fa~ n

the Tribe.

The Montana taxes were first challenged, and eventually
upheld, in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Bd. of
Equalization, 299

u.s. 159 (1936) (involving only the 1924 Act).

Thereafter, the taxes were regularly assessed and paid by the
v'
lessees until 1977. In that year the Solicitor of the Department

(
~

of the Interior issued an opinion stating that the 1938 Act had

-4-

I

"replaced" the 1924 Act, and so withdrawn the authority to tax
the mineral leases.

~esp brought this suit challenging the Montana taxes insofar
as they fell upon the ~ be.

In its answer, petr argued that the

1924 authorization applied to :eases under the 1938 Act, and that
in any event the sole legal incidence of the tax falls upon the
non-Indian producers, so the Tribe is not being taxed.

The DC

(Hatfield, D. Montana) upheld the taxes on the first of these
grounds.

State taxation of Indians requires congressional

consent; that is provided by the 1924 Act.

The only question was

whether the 1938 Act repealed that authorization.

While the 1938

Act was a comprehensive revision of the existing law, it did not
address the issue of state taxation.
the matter in the legislative history.

There is no discussion of
Something more than

silence is necessary to support a repeal by implication.
Moreover, from 1938 until 1977, Interior had consistently viewed
with approval state taxation of the production of oil and gas on
Indian lands.

Its 1977 opinion ran counter to 40 years of prior

administrative practice and congressional acquiescence.

Greater

weight was due the consistent past practice than this recent and
sudden _~ ersal.

A panel of CA9 (Sneed, Anderson, Reinhardt (concurring in
the result but not participating in the preparation or approval
of the opinion)) affirmed.

The necessary congressional consent

was plainly given in the 1924 Act, and the 1938 Act did not work
an implicit repeal.
coexistence.

The two statutes are capable of easy

The legislative history does not provide the

-5-

necessary showing of intent to repeal.

Perhaps most importantly,

there has been a longstanding administrative interpretation
upholding the right of States to tax oil and gas production.
Since the two statutes have "concurrent, cumulative, and
compatible effect," the State's power to tax extends equally to
leases entered into under the 1924 Act and those entered into
under the 1938 Act.
CA9 then reheard the case en bane

~d ~ It

concluded that while the 1938 Act did not repeal the 1924 Act, it
did completely supersede it.

Leases entered into pursuant to the

earlier Act were still subject to taxation.

The 1924 Act had no

relevance to leases entered into pursuant to the 1938 Act,
however, and production under such leases could not be taxed
because there was no congressional authorization.

The CA

rejected petr's argument that if the 1938 Act did not repeal the
1924 Act, it must have incorporated it.

In the absence of any

evidence in the legislative history, the court refused to believe
"that Congress intended that part of one sentence in one of the
statutes otherwise totally superseded by the 1938 Act be
incorporated into the 1938 Act, and that Congress manifested its
intention through silence."

State taxation would also conflict

with the purpose of the IRA, which was to promote "a significant
increase in tribal autonomy

~ nd

authority and the extension to

the tribes of 'an opportunity to take over the control of their
own resources.'"
/

The court gave little weight to the prior

position of the Interior Department, since it had been expressed

-6only in two unpublished memoranda, not contemporaneous with the
Act itself, and had since been repudiated.
The dissenters agreed that the 1938 Act did not repeal the
1924 Act: repeals by implicacion are disfavored, the two Acts are
not inconsistent, the 1938 Act was not comprehensive, and for 40
years the Department of the Interior thought there had been no
repeal.

Absent a repeal, the two statutes should be read

together and full effect given to both.

Since it is still in

effect, the 1924 Act must be construed to have some force.

While

the 1938 Act replaced the leasing provisions of the 1924 Act, the

----

taxing authorization was left intact.

No express incorporation

was required; the taxing authorization applies under its own
terms.

If Congress meant to abrogate the authority to tax, it

(

surely would have

~

~ ~ONTENTIONS:

im~e

that sh

e that intent clear.
Petr -- This is a question of increasing

ld be resolved by this Court.

separate actions are now

pe~ding

Ninety-six

in Montana and are stayed

pending the outcome of this case; $5 million in taxes have been
paid under protest.

Similar cases, involving $25 million, are

pen~g in Arizona and New Mexico. ~~
CA9 erred on the

merits.~asional

references in opinions

by this Court suggest that it views the 1924 authorization as
still in effect.

It is.

Congress could have repealed the taxing

authority but did not do so.

The CA relied too heavily on its

view of the general purposes of the IRA to inform its reading of
/

the 1938 Act; the IRA really has little to do with this question.
Other courts, including this one, have refused to look to the

-7-

c

general policies underlying the IRA in construing other statutes.
The CA should have deferred to the longstanding administrative
interpretation.
Resp -- The case is not ripe for review.

The CA did not

actually hold any Montana tax invalid, but remanded for a
determination of where the legal incidence of the taxes fell.
Most of the money at issue in Montana, and in the cases pending
in other States, involves taxes on producers, not on the Indians,
and therefore a decision by this Court would not affect the
primary issue in those cases.
The 1924 Act authorizes taxation of mineral production "on
such lands."
statute.

Those are simply the lands leased under the 1924

Solely as a matter of statutory construction, apart

from questions of repeal, the decision below was correct because
the 1924 authority does not extend to post-1938 leases.

The

first administrative opinion actually to consider the
relationship between the 1924 and 1938 Acts was the one issued in
1977.

That is the only administrative decision on point and

deserves deference.

The CA properly looked to the purposes of

the IRA for general guidance.
By virtue of its express repealer provision, repealing "all
Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith," the 1938 Act did
repeal the 1924 Act.

The tax consent substantially conflicts
the 1938 Act and the IRA.
Idaho, Nevada, N. Dakota) -- Amici point out

vital interest" in resolution of this question, decry the
----.:...-

-H-

(

uncertainty created by the CA's decision, and repeat some of the
arguments made on the merits by petr.
4.

DISCUSSION:

s ~gnificant _and

This petn raises issues that are

becoming more so.

Although litigation has not

thus far been extensive, the issue has cropped up occasionally
and the interest of amici indicates that it will arise more
.
. ..,.,-;
Th e 1ssue
1s
1mportant to t h e States an d t h e

f requen tl y.

Indians, even if the amount of money at stake ahs been exagerated
by petrs.

On the merits, the case is difficult.

See Price &

Clinton, Law & The American Indian 804-806 (1983) (noting that
7\}
the "special problems" caused by t e two Actg are not
"definitively resolved," though a "strong argument" can be made
that the 1938 Act repealed that of 1924); Cohen's Handbook of
f

Federal Indian Law 409 (1982)

(pretty much treating the 1938 Act

as a repeal on the basis of the opinion from Interior).

None of

the arguments anyone has offered are entirely convincing.
General canons of statutory construction are not much help, and
there is little legislative history.

Where one would ordinarily

look to plain words, there is a vacuum --"plain silence."

The

question is whether one would expect Congress to have spoken up
if it meant for the States to be able to tax, or if it meant for
them not to.

/

The posture of the case argues against granting cert in two
ways.

First,

while ~

complete repeal of

/

does argue that

th~

th~effected

a

it has not filed a cross-petn.

The CA held tQat the 1924 Act had not been repealed and that petr
could tax the 12 pre-1938 leases.

Technically, the failure to

-9-

cross-petn forecloses a finding that there had been complete
repeal, which would expand the relief granted below.

The Court

remains free, however, to determine what the taxing authority
under the 1938 Act is, and that is the heart of the dispute.
Second, there is the question of ripeness.
-~

On remand the DC

might decide that the legal indidence of the tax does not fall on
the tribe, which would moot the question whether petr can tax the
resp directly.

The taxes might still be invalid if they

excessively impair resp's ability to govern by depriving it of
potential revenues; thus the taxes might yet be struck down on
other grounds.

Any lack of finality is not a jurisdictional

obstacle, however, and the legal issue is squarely presented, has
been finally determined, and requires no factual development.

I

/

think the case is ripe enough.
In light of the federal interest, the importance of the 1977
Interior Department opinion, and the possibility that Interior's
views have changed with the new administration, the views of the
Solicitor General would be helpful.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend CVSG, with a view toward

granting.
There is a response and an amicus brief.

August 17, 1984

Herz

Opinion in petn

Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians
No. 83-2161

This case is here on writ of certiorari to the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The respondent/ , the

Blackfeet Indian Tribe, filed sui ~challenging the application of e.e¥-eral Montana taxes to the Tribe's royalty inter~-b..~~
ests in oil and gas leases, , ~ssued pursuant to the Indian
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938.
The District Court granted
State, holding that the taxes were authorized by
statute.

Jr t

L

held that the 1938 Act' under which these

1---lu/ ~

\ leases were issued, did

ot repeal ot supersed~ ' the A~ I

Istatu>te.
~t ~-r ~/tu_ .s:~

.4:> ~

J

'

~

~

1

Court.

en bane Court of Appeals reversed the District

Although it agreed that the 1924 Act had not been
I

'J.!

~8

repealed by the passage of the

Act, the Court of Ap-

~i;., ffl~~

peals determined that theA1924 statute did not apply to

1a...kr-

leases executed pursuant to the

A

~

Act.

We agree with the Court of Appeals.
and

individual: • Ind±a~are

Indian

tribes~

exempt from state taxation...J within

their own territory unless Congress authorizes the imposiJ

tion of such taxes.

-

Our cases establish that congressional
-----.,..

consent to state taxation of Indians must be explicitly
clear, and that statutes are to be construed liberally in

..
'

2.
favor of the Indians.

The authorization in the 1924 Act was

omitte~~e

explicit, but this authority was
Thus, the

~lew-~8

1938 Act.

""

Act contains no authorization to tax the

Tribe.
Accordingly, we hold that Montana may not tax

th~

q

~ ~r. ,~~.. J/1.4A... I 9 3d ~1-:

Blackfeet's interests in the£e leases,

~ ~

affirm the

1\

judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Justice White has filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Rehnquist and Stevens have joined.

••••••••••••••••••••
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

March 26, 1985

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Lynda

No. 83-2161

(<A q ~ ~)
1985 ~ ~ ~~ t.J./z_?)

Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe

Argued January 15,

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the State of Montana may tax the Blackfeet
~-~

Tribe's royalty interest under oil and gas leases issued to
non-Indian

lessees pursuant

Act of 1938, 25

u.s.c.

§§

to the

396a-396g?

Indian Mineral Leasing

2.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Background
The relevant statutory history of this case begins
with the Act of February 28, 1891 (the "1891 Act"), codified

----

at

25

u.s.c.

authorization

§397,
of

which

mineral

was

the

leases

involving

That act authorized mineral leases for
ten years on lands

"1924 Act"),

first

"bought and paid

Congressional
Indian

terms not to exceed
for"

by the

The 1891 Act was amended by the Act of May 29,
codified at 25

u.s.c.

lands.

Indians.
1924

(the

§398, which provided that

Unallotted land
subject to lease for
mining purposes for a period of ten years under
§397 . • • may be leased • • • by the Secretar of
the Interio r , wi~the cone
o
the
Indian
cou~ for oil--a-lid gas mining purposes for a
perTC5a of not to exceed ten years, and as much
longer as oil or gas shall be found in paying
quantities, and the terms of any existing oil and
gas mining lease may in like manner be amended by
extending the term thereof for as long as oil or
gas
shall
be
found
in
paying
quantities:
Provided, That the p roduction of oil and gas and
other minerals on such lands may be taxed by th f
State in which said lands are located i n a l
respects the same as production on unrestricted
lands, and the Secretary of the Inter i or i s
authorize d and di rected to cause to be paid the
tax so assessed against the royalty Interests on
sa id land s:
Prov i ded , however, That such tax
shall not become a lien or charge of any kind or
character against the land or the property of the
Indian owner.

~ •
l..A-\.

Jrl
_·
v~
L:.~

The 1924 Act was enacted primarily to lengthen the terms of
oil and gas leases, which had been fixed at ten years by the
1891

Act.

(1982).

F.

Cohen,

Handbook

-------

of

Federal

Indian

Law

534

Its noteworthy feature for purposes of this case is

1

the proviso',
=<!!:>

Sta _te

underlined

~

t

in red,

o.l.l.(

above,

'

that permitted the

ta~in~e ..::_; c ~n.E

to

-

Other

leases.

statutes

were

enacted

from mi ~ ral

in

the

1920's

authorizing mineral leases on other types of Indian land not
covered by the 1891 Act; these created a patchwork quilt of
mineral leasing rules that left the law governing leases on
tribal land in a state of confusion.

Id.

The Act of May 11, 1938 (the "1938 Act"), codified
at

u.s.c.

25

confusion

by

396a-396g,

§§

creating

was

enacted

comprehensive

to

remedy

legislation

the

governing

-~

mineral leases on Indian land.

The House and Senate Reports

--------------

-

reflect the intent of the legislation to "obtain uniformity
so far as practicable of the law relating to the leasing of
tribal

lands

for

s.

mining purposes."

Rep.

No.

985,

75th

Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937); H.R. Rep. No. 1872, 75th Cong. 3d
Sess.

1

(1938).

legislation
leasing

of

The reports also stated the hope that the

"would
Indian

be

a

lands

more
for

satisfactory

general

mining

law

for

the

purposes.

It

will bring all mineral-leasing matters in harmony with the
n

Indian Reorganization Act

S. Rep.

No.

9 8 5, at 3;

H.R. Rep. No. 1872, at 3.
Section

1

of

the

language of the 1924 Act,

1938

Act

closely

tracked

the

in permitting mineral leasing on

unallotted lands with

the approval of the Secretary for

period not

ten years

to exceed

and as

a

long thereafter as

minerals in paying quantities were produced.

Other sections

provided uniform procedures for leasing land and protecting

4.

the

rights of

reservations;

the
the

Indians,
1938

and

Act

for

did

the exemption of some

not,

however,

taxing provision like the 1924 Act did.
1938 Act provided
inconsistent
revolves

that

.. [a] 11 Act

herewith

around

are

whether,

as

to

or

parts of Acts
This

repealed."

leases

a

Section 7 of the

[sic]

hereby

contain

executed

case

after

the

.--~~

enactment of the 1938 Act, the taxing provision of the 1924
~~

----------

Act remained in force.

B.

Relevant

Court

Administrative

and

Decisions

Interpretations
This Court
v.

Montana

decided

Board

that

in British-American Oil Producing Co.

of

the

Equalization,

Blackfeet

u.s.

299

reservation

156

was

(1936),

created

by

legislation, not by executive order, and therefore, that the
taxing provision of the 1924 Act applied to Blackfeet land.
No

decision

I

of

this

Court

has

the

addressed

interrelationship between the 1924 and 1938 Acts.
Several opinions of the Department of Interior are

relevant.
pursuant

l~n

A
to

the

1891

Act

dealing

relied

with

without

leases

executed

qualification on

.

~'

\.""\

British-American to hold that the Blackfeet were l1able for
state

taxes

leases.

on

The

royalty

opinion
-~

(Petn App.,

at 232.)

interests

makes

no

in

mention

..

A 1954 o2in
_ . ,i.on

on British-American and the 1943 Dept.
to

hold

that

the

taxability

oil

question

of

and

gas

the

mining

1938

Act.

also relies directly
of Interior opinion
is

settled.

---~

This

5.

opinion does not, however, state when the leases in question

~~
rY

~-

were

executed,

nor

does

it

give

any

indication

~~

~f l'f

(Petn App.,

at 248.)

To the same effect is a 1955
opinion
'=
..

of the Department

(Petn App., at 258.)

In 1956:

~

the Department wrote an opinion finally

1-t> l 4 1 l ttt:ifo ac k now 1 e d g1ng
·
·
t ;
e ex1stence
o f t h e 1938 Act.

.

~
~~~

1924 Act.

It held

that

~ -

mention

of

frl~
~

contained
the

1924

taxing

taxing

provision
provision

nor
was

any
not

( Petn App.,

A 1J 66 ~t~ ion relied on the 1956 decision.

--

F~alJY ,

detailed

no

and therefore remained in force.

at 263, 265.)

~~'i~~r.

~

Act
one,

~ incon ~tent

'

that §7 of the 1938 Act repealed only

those acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the 1938 Act:
because

J4 ":, . ~.

It ruled that

the 1938 Act had no effect on the taxing provision of the

~~ ~~

_J.
"r

the

solicitor who wrote the opinion knew the 1938 Act existed.

~~

()v- r

that

opinion

i ~ 1977~

that

t ~Depart~ent

/~ver~

its

issued a long and

earlier

determination

that the 1938 Act did not affect the taxability of Indian
mineral

leases.

It

concluded

that

British-American

was

inapposite since it was decided before 1938, and the parties
there had stipulated that the lease involved was authorized
under the 1891 Act and therefore, that the 1924 Act applied.
British-American
executed

after

therefore
the

1938

Act

had
was

no

relevance

enacted.

The

to

leases

Department

ruled that the f ilure of the 1938 Act to mention taxation

-

created an ambiguity: applying the well-established rule of

------------

construction

that

such

ambiguities

liberally in favor of the Indian,

~~ ~ 438 --;;;;~

are

to

be

construed

the Department concluded

-

--

6.

____ _____ ·-- -

that

leases
..____
___
..

executed

pursuant

___

.... -·

.

to the
--·---.....____.

-------·
1938

Act were T not f
~----L-. ~_j

subject to state taxation.

- -----

c.

·-· -···· - -·-· ·-- ·-·---·--·-----.

Facts and Decisions Below
After

opinion,

the

resps

favorable

filed

1977 Department

this

suit

in

DC

of

Interior

challenging

the

application of several Montana taxes to the Tribe's royalty
interest in oil and gas produced on unallotted lands on the
Tribe's reservation.

The state taxes assessed against the

Tribe's royalty interest have been paid by the lessees, who
then deduct
The

DC

ruling

the amount

granted
that

from the Tribe's royalty payments.

summary

the

judgment

in

favor

1938 Act had not mentioned

repeals by implication were disfavored.
weight
what

to

the

it

of

the

taxation,

Interior opinion,

to

longstanding

be

the

and

The DC gave little

1977 Department of

considered

State,

citing

contrary

admininstrative interpretation that the taxes were valid.

--------------A panel

affirmed.

On . .

of

CA9

(Sneed,

r~e~ ing{in ba,n ~

Anderson,
the court

& Reinhardt)
(Fletcher,

J.)

reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.

It

concluded that the taxin

----------

the

1938

Act,

but

remained

1891

and

in effect for

to

however,

that the 1938 Act did not
and therefore,

1924

Acts.

-~

that

leases executed

-----------~~~---------------~

pursuant

provision,

the

~

been repealed by

It

also concluded,

incorporate the taxing

it did not apply to leases

ruled that although the taxing provision was consistent with

C /1- q

6.

that

-

leases

'------

---

-----

executed

-

1938

pursuant

-----

subject to state taxation.

c.

Facts and Decisions Below
After

opinion,

the

resps

favorable

filed

this

1977

Department

suit

in

DC

of

Interior

challenging

the

application of several Montana taxes to the Tribe's royalty
interest in oil and gas produced on unallotted lands on the
Tribe's reservation.

The state taxes assessed against the

Tribe's royalty interest have been paid by the lessees, who
then deduct
The

-DC

ruling

the

amount

granted
that

from the Tribe's royalty payments.

summary

the

judgment

1938 Act had

in

favor

not mentioned

repeals by implication were disfavored.
weight
what

to

the

it

1977 Department of

considered

to

of

be

the

State,

taxation,

and

The DC gave little

Interior opinion,

the

longstanding

admininstrative interpretation that the taxes were va

--

A panel
affirmed.

On . .

of

CA9

(Sneed,

r~earing 0"

Anderson,

bajiC) the court

reversed in part and remanded for

----

further

& Rei
(Fletcht

proceedin~

concluded that the taxing provision had not been repealed by ~ ~ lJ
- - - --.._ -::::..__~ ~ c.. rr--,
the 1938 Act, but remained in effect for leases executed

---

pursuant
however,

to

1891

and

1924

Acts.

~~~

that the 1938 Act did not

provision,

-

--~---.

the

and

therefore,

---------

that

-

It

also concluded,

incorporate the taxing

it did not applL to

executed after the 1938 Act was enacted.

~ es

The en bane court

ruled that although the taxing provision was consistent with

7.

the allotment policy in effect in 1924, it was inconsistent
with the policies of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
("IRA"}

to foster

Therefore,

the

tribal sovereignty and economic growth.

court

ruled

that

Congress

could

not

have

intended the taxing provision to carry over to the 1938 Act,
,..--~
"""'-'-- _,__ ~.
since that Act was specifically intended to harmonize with
the IRA.

The court remanded to the DC for a determination

of where the legal incidence of the taxes fell;
on

the

oil

determine

and

gas

whether

producers,

the

the

DC

was

taxes were preempted.

if it fell
directed

These

to

remand

questions are not presented in this Court.
The

.....

dissent

(Anderson,

v

...........

Wallace,

&

Kennedy}

concurred in the majority's holding that the 1938 Act had
not

impliedly

disagreed

repealed

with

provision was

the

in effect

contended,

ruling

1924
that

Act.
the

They argued that (i}
for

1924

dissenters

Act's

taxing

( i i}

if the 1924 Act were

the pre-1938 leases,

how could it have no force

thereafter;

The

inapplicable to leases entered into pursuant

to the 1938 Act.
still

the

the

for

longstanding

as

the majority

leases executed
administrative

interpretation prior to 1977 should be heeded; and (iii}

if

Congress had intended to abrogate its prior grant of taxing
authority to the States,

it would have made such an intent

clear.
In this Court, resp does not attack CA9's ruling
that

it must continue to pay taxes under the 1924 Act on

8.

royalties from leases executed ;;;----.
prior to the enactment of the
1938 Act.

D. Conference Votes
At
affirm,

as

Conference,
did

the

CHIEF

JUSTICE BRENNAN,

originally

voted

JUSTICE MARSHALL,

to

JUSTICE

BLACKMON, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR.

JUSTICES WHITE, REHNQUIST,

and STEVENS voted to reverse.

The CHIEF then changed his

vote to pass: according to his clerk, he did so because he
was unhappy about not voting with JUSTICE REHNQUIST on this
case.

As far as I

know,

the CHIEF has not cast his vote,

although he has put it on the list with the other tied cases
and

has

left

it

unassigned.

conclusions from this.
has

the

potential

You

may

draw

your

own

Your vote aside, I suppose the case

for

not

being

tied,

but

the

CHIEF's

treatment of the case may indicate that he is leaning toward
voting to reverse.

II. DISCUSSION

This
answer exists.

is

one

of

those

cases

in

which

no

clear

The 1938 Act and its legislative history are

silent on the question of taxation:

they neither expressly

provide for taxation nor expressly prohibit it, nor do they
acknowledge
1924 Act.

the

existence

Section

7 of

of
the

the

taxing

1938 Act,

provision

in

which repeals

Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith,"

the
"all

is ambiguous

9.

as

to whether

Facially,

it repeals the taxing provision.

that provision is not inconsistent with the 1938 Act because
there is no clause relating to taxes in that Act with which
to conflict.

the legislative history
--------------~
makes clear that the purpose of the 1938 Act was to create a

~
v
tU---1-

,~..-:;

r~
~

~

!1!3f

a.d

uniform set

On

of

the

other

rules

hand,

governing

mineral

leasing

________...,

,........---...

provision

from

1924

the

Act

Indian

Retaining the

lands that would be in harmony with the IRA.
taxation

of

arguably

would

be

1924

Act

applied only to certain kinds of Indian lands, and (ii)

the

inconsistent

IRA was

with

this

intended

sufficiency,

to

which

purpose,

restore
would

since

(i)

the

Indian sovereignty

be

hindered

by

and

requiring

of

sides

reading
have

the

1938

Act

to

resorted

works

smoothly.

various

canons

Thus,
of

the

Neither

Indians to pay state taxes on their royalty income
way

self-

both

statutory

construction in aid of their interpretations.
The
provision
intact.
clause

was

State
not

contends
repealed

that
and

only

1924

therefore,

It cites old cases by
repealing

the

Act's
must

taxing

still

be

this Court holding that a

inconsistent

acts

"implies

very

strongly that there may be acts on the same subject which

u.s.

are not thereby repealed," Hess v. Reynolds, 113

73, 79

(1885), and that such a repealer clause indicates Congress's
intent

"to

relative
Henderson,

leave

in

the

same

to
78

u.s.

force

some

subject

(11 Wall.)

portions

of

former

matter,"

United

652,

(1870).

656

acts

States

v.

Congress

knew how to repeal the taxing provision, but did not do so.

·'

10.

There

~,

implication,

United

States

v.

by

repeals

against

presumption

strong

a

is

Borden Co.,

308

u.s.

188, 198 (1939), especially an implied repeal of a specific
statute by a general one, Morton v. Mancari, 417
550-551

(1974).

u.s.

535,

Therefore, the State argues, the provision

--- _____

must be read as applicable to leases under the 1938 Act.

-----~

StJ-

The SG and , resp
argue to the____________.___
contrary that other
--'""-"----....-"'---""'---

&--~

~

rules of interpretation govern.

~~

taxing proviso was not repealed,
Act

for

Thus

leases

the

First, resp argues that the

execu.teq after

canons

of

but replaced by the 1938

the

construction

later
cited

act's
by

the

enactment.
State

are

.....

inapplicable here.

Second, the SG observes that it is well

---

------------~ ~

established that Congress's consent to the state taxation of

---

Indians

will

be

~'

intent.

-

~

(1976).

found

~---------- ~---....

<2.!!1-Y if manifested by the clearest

Bryan v. Itasca County, 426

Congress has

never

given a

u.s.

373, 392-393

blanket authorization

for taxation of Indians' income--even from unallotted lands;
the 1924

Act,

for

instance,

permitted

taxation of

income

from land leased for mining, but not for grazing purposes.
The 1937 Quapaw Act, which contains an explicit and limited
consent

to

enacted

tax,

the

demonstrates

1938

Act

that

knew

the

such

same Congress
consents

affirmatively and clearly stated to be effective.

must

that
be

Exemption

from taxation has long been regarded as a principal aspect
of

---

Indian

would

be

sovereignty;

a

radical

one,

any
and

departure
such a

inferred from Congress's silence.

this

principle

result should

not be

At the very least,

the

11.

1938 Act
carries

is

ambiguous

over.

such as

to whether

This Court has

these are

Carpenter v.

as

long

to be resolved

Shaw,

280

u.s.

363,

the

taxing provision

held

that

ambiguities

in favor of the Indian,
367

(1930),

and,

the SG

contends, that principle applies here.
Moreover, the SG argues, the way the 1938 Act was

---------

drafted

indicates

- - --=--

that Congress

intended

to eliminate

the

-

taxing pro ~ n.
The Act was ~~
intended to be comprehensive
,.---..__
concerning the leasing of unallotted lands, as reflected by
the

fact

that

permitted.

§1

refers

Sections

1

to

and

what
2

shall

"hereafter"

replaced

the

be

substantive

leasing provisions of the 1924 Act: the tax clause had been
only a

proviso to the substantive provision,

did not include it.

Likewise, the new §§1 and 2 in the 1938

Act were closely patterned after
Act and
taxing

and Congress

the language of the 1924

incorporated several aspects of that Act,
provision

was

eliminated.

These

factors

yet the
strongly

suggest that Congress knowingly replaced the 1924 Act with
the 1938 ._
Act and deliberately omitted the tax consent •
Both sides, of course, advance other arguments in
favor of their positions.
overlooking

in

The State contends that CA9 erred
longstanding

the

administrative

interpretation that the taxing provision remained in force.
The

State contends

"consistent
States

to

practice
collect

that
of
the

the Department of

Interior

over

of

forty

taxes

in

years"

question,

had a

authorizing
and

the

Department's 1977 opinion was a "bolt out of the blue" that

.1-'·

There was no change in the

should be given no deference.
statute

that

would

prompt

such

a

change

in

viewpoint.

Moreover, the State has been collecting the applicable taxes
throughout the years,

and neither

the

Indians nor

the oil

and gas producers challenged them until 1976.
As

CA9

and

resp

point

out,

however,

the

administrative record is not so strongly consistent as the

-

State contends.

The opinions prior to 1956 made no mention

------------------------------

of the 1938 Act or to leases executed pursuant thereto.

The

most that can be said about these opinions is that they did
not address the
that

the

American

1924

issue presented by this case,
Act

applied.

Interior,

however,

and

this

The

1956 opinion of

did

but assumed

Court's decision

address

the

the

in

British-

Department of

question

whether

the

taxing provision had been repealed by the 1938 Act and held
that

it

had

not.

A

In 1977,

issuance.
carefully

and

in

on

the

1956

the Department reconsidered

the

issue

more

1966

detail

reversed its prior decision.
that

the

although
opinion.
because

Department
it

opinion

had

a

unquestionably

than

appears

to

have

it

had

in

1956,

and

It is hard, therefore, to say {
consistent
reversed

The 1977 opinion deserves
it

relied

been

40-year

itself

with

some weight,

much

more

practice,
the

1977

however,

thorough

and

carefully considered than the 1956 opinion.
The State considers that CA9 erred in looking to
trends, policies, and legislative goals relating to the IRA,
instead of to the statute and how it had been consistently

~

13.

applied

and

interpreted.

CA9's

use

of

the

policies

underlying the IRA to interpret the 1938 Act was error, the
State

argues,

taxation

of

functions

because

minerals

reserved

the
or

to

IRA

royalty

411

u.s.

only

in nature."

145,

correct

150

deal

as

CA9

Indians--are

the

IRA

was

the

exercised
of

tax

"essentially

The State contends

about

with

questions

Mescalero Apache Tribe

(1973).

statement

not

income.

legislators,

immunities--especially concerning
legislative

does

v.

Jones,

that CA9's

that

it

was

intended to eliminate the allotment system and provide for
reacquisition of lands by the tribes.

CA9's inference that

the taxing provisions of the 1924 Act should therefore fall
is nothing but unfounded speculation unsupported either by
the

language

of

the

IRA or

its

legislative

history.

In

fact, Congress had rejected earlier versions of the IRA that
provided for broad immunities for the Indians from state and
local

taxes.

This

supports

instead

the

inference

that

Congress intended for the 1924 Act provision to stand.
The State is correct that much of CA9's reliance
on perceived goals of the IRA and how those goals affected
Congress's

intent as to the 1938 Act is pure speculation.

On the other hand,
supra,

Part !.A.,

the House and Senate Reports, as quoted
at

3,

do state

that Congress wished to

bring the mineral leasing laws in harmony with the purposes
of the IRA.
permitting
leasing

The SG persuasively points out that statutes
state

were

an

taxation
integral

of

Indian

part

of

income
the

from

allotment

mineral
policy

repudiated by the IRA.

The

allotm~nt

policy was intended to

assimilate the Indians into American society; this was to be
accomplished
land

into

by

the eventual passage of

non-Indian

hands

jurisdiction of the State.

and

under

unallotted

Indian

the

taxing

full

The taxing provision of the 1924

Act and similar acts of that time was intended to make the
revenue available to the State during the transition period.
At the same time,

taxing power was not given over allotted

lands leased for mining purposes, because these lands were
intended to remain in Indian hands, and thus, forever beyond
the taxing power of the State.

This allotment policy was

repudiated by the IRA in 1934, removing the expectation that
the unallotted lands would pass into non-Indian hands.
justification
was

also

for

allowing

thereby

States

eliminated,

and

to tax
thus,

unallotted
having

provision in the 1938 Act was consistent with
This

is

reflected

by

§5

of

the

IRA,

which

no

The
lands

taxing

IRA policy.

provides

that

lands acquired by the United States in trust for the Indians
"shall

be

exempt

from state and

local

taxation."

The SG

also argues that retaining the taxing provision would have
been inconsistent with the IRA's goal of rehabilitating the
Indians'

economic

oon affairs

and

Jones, supra, 411

life

and giving them control over

property.

u.s.,

See Mescalero Apache

their

Tribe

v.

at 152-153.

The sum total of all of this is that the statute
and the legislative history do not address the problem.

I

15.

found

the

SG's

brief

most persuasive,

recommend that you vote to affirm.

and

am

inclined

to

This Court's cases are

-

--·-

clear that Congress's intent to permit taxation of Indians
~ -·~
-----------·- -..__.
must be clear, and that ambiguities must be resolved in
~
favor of the Indians.
Given the ambiguity in the statute

--

here and the lack of evidence in the legislative history, I
believe that those well-established principles of Indian law
should govern, notwithstanding the fact that the practice of
collecting taxes from the Indians continued for years after
the

1938

Act

was passed.

vote to affirm.

I

therefore

recommend

that you

.

- - ---

-- - - ... -- ---- --------- _.._.
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Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians
No. 83-2161

First Draft

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the State
of Montana may tax the Blackfeet Tribe's royalty interests
under

oil

and

gas

leases

issued

to

non-Indian

lessees

2.

pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch.

u.s.c.

198, 52 Stat. 347, 25

§396a et seq.

I

Respondent Blackfeet Tribe filed this suit in the
United States District Court for

the District of Montana

challenging the application of several Montana taxes 1 to
the Tribe's royalty interest in oil and gas produced under
leases
'

issued

unallotted
granted

to

lands

by
on

the

Tribe.

the

non-Indian

The

Tribe's

lessees

in

leases
v

reservations
accordance

involved
and
with

were
the

Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347,

1 At issue are the taxes adopted in the following
statutes: the Oil and Gas Severance Tax, Mont. Code Ann.
§§15-36-101 et seq. (1983); the Oil and Gas Net Proceeds
Tax, Mont. Code Ann. §§15-23-601 et seq.; the Oil and Gas
Conservati n Tax, Mont. Code Ann. §§82-11-101 et seq.; and
the Resou ce Indemnity Trust Tax, Mont. Code Ann. §§15-38101 et se •

3.

25

u.s.c.

§396a et seq.

~here-af--te-r,.

the 1938 Act].

The . /

taxes at issue were paid to the State by the lessees and
then deducted

by

made to the Tribe.
injunctive
statutes. 2

relief
The

the

from

the

royalty

payments

The Blackfeet sought declaratory and
against

Tribe

the 1938 Act did

lessees

enforcement

argued

of

the

state

tax

to the District Court that

not authorize

the

State

to tax tribal

royalty interests and thus that the taxes were unlawful.

2 The Blackfeet properly invoked the jurisdiction of
the district court pursuant to 28 u.s.c. §1362, which
provides:
"The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by
any Indian tribe or band with a governing body
duly
recong ized
by
the
Secretary
of
the
Interior, wherein the matter in controversy
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States."
As we held in Moe v.
& Kootenai Tribes,
425 u.s.
463 (1976), a suit
an Indian tribe to enjoin the
enforcement of state tax laws is cognizable in the
district court under §1362 despite the general sar ~a a~

~

:iii · ::::::~g;n 28

~

~~

-IN\~ l.l5C ~ /3'-/}

~ ~ ~ lJiUt)a.tj~ ~
~ ~~·ovv:>
~ ltU.05 .

1

u.s.c.

§1341.

See at
~

474-475.

l4:>-s<J.s.,

4.

The

District Court

rejected

this

claim and

State's motion for summary judgment.

granted

the

The court held that

the state taxes were authorized by a 1924 statute, Act of
May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codified at 25
§398

[~ a4:tex:

~ e 1924 Act], and that the 1938 Act,

under which

the leases

repeal

authorization.

this

a

u.s.c.

persuaded

by

1977

Interior

supporting

in question were
The

opinion
the

of

District
the

issued,
Court

Department

Blackfeet's

position,

did not
was

not

of

the

citing

contrary views taken earlier by the Executive Branch.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision.
On

rehearing

en

bane,

the Court of Appeals

part and remanded the case for
F.2d

1192

(1984).

The

reversed

in

further proceedings.

729

the

tax

court

held

that

5.

authorization in the 1924 Act was not repealed by the 1938
Act

and

thus

remained

in

pursuant to the 1924 Act.
that

1938

the

author izatioR

Act

for

leases

executed

The court also held, however,

did

provision

effect

of

incorporate

not
the

1924

Act,

and

the

tax

therefore

/,

that

the

authorization did

not apply to leases executed

after the enactment of the 1938 Act.

The court reasoned

that the taxing provision of the 1924 Act was inconsistent
with
1934,

the
ch.

policies
576,

of

48

{hereafte.~:)J:!-LIRA]
.
A
specifically
IRA,

Congress

to

the

Stat.
Since

harmonize

could

not

Indian
984,

25

u.s.c.

1938

the
Indian
have

Reorganization

leasing

intended

leases issued under the 1938 Act.

Act

it

§461
was
laws
to

Act
et

of

seq.

adopted
with
apply

the
to

The court remanded the

case to the District Court to determine where the legal

6.

incidence
consider

of

the

whether,

taxes
if

fell,

the

and directed

taxes

fell

on

the

the court to
oil and gas

producers instead of the Indians, the taxes were preempted
by

federal

certiorari

law.
to

We

granted

resolve

the

whether

State's

Montana

petition

may

tax

for

Indian

royalty interests arising out of leases executed after the

u.s.

adoption of the 1938 Act.

(1984).

We affirm

the decision of the en bane Court of Appeals that it may
not.
II
Congress

first

authorized

mineral leasing
ch .3i.5 J d6 61AX . 1'{5"

of

Indian lands in the Act of Feb. 28, 189l,~codified at 25

u.s.c.

§397

[her~qfter

The Act authorized

leases for terms not to exceed ten years on lands "bought

7.

and paid for" by the Indians.
1924.

The 1891 Act was amended in

The amendment provided in pertinent part:
. ·· ~
Unallot ed land
subject to lease for
mining pu poses for a period of ten years under
§397 • • • may be leased • • . by the SecretarY.,
f th ~ erior, with the consent of the [Indianj
for oil and gas mining purposes for a
per 10
f not to exceed ten years, and as much
longer as oil or gas shall be found in paying
quanti ties, and the terms of any existing oil
and gas mining lease may in like manner be
amended by extending the term thereof for as
long as oil or gas shall be found in paying
quantities:
Provided, That the production of
oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may
be taxed by the State in which said lands are
located in all respects the same as production
on unrestricted lands, and the Secretary of the
Interior is authorized and directed to cause to
be paid the tax so assessed against the royalty
interests on said lands:
Provided, however,
That such tax shall not become a lien or charge
of any kind or character against the land or the
property of the Indian owner.
Act of May 29,
1924, j codified at 25 u.s.c. §398.
~ ~3 SkU . ;Jl/~)

Montana

relies on

claiming

the

the

first

authority

to

proviso
tax

the

I

in the 1924 Act in
Blackfeet's

royalty

payments.
In

1938,

Congress

adopted

comprehensive

legislation in an effort to "obtain uniformity so far as

8.

practicable of the law relating to the leasing of tribal
lands for mining purposes."

lSI
~ Sess.

'fl
A (1938).

Like

S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong. ,
the

1924

Act,

the

1938

Act

permitted, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior, mineral leasing of unallotted lands for a period
not to exceed ten years and as long thereafter as minerals
in paying quantities were produced.
uniform

leasing

Indians.

See 25

procedures

u.s.c.

The Act also detailed

designed

§§396b-396g.

to

protect

the

The 1938 Act did not

contain a provision authorizing state taxation; nor did it
repeal specifically the authorization in the 1924 Act.

A

general repealer clause was provided in section 7 of the
Act: "All Act [sic] or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith
are
case

hereby
is

repealed."

whether

the

The

question

1924 Act's

presented

proviso

that

by

this

authorizes

9.

state taxation was repealed by the 1938 Act, or if left
intact, applies to leases executed under the 1938 Act.
III
The Constitution vests the Federal Government with
exclusive

authority

Art.

8, cl.3; see Oneida Indian Nation v. County of

I,

Oneida,
Georgia,

§

414

u.s.

6 Pet.

over

661,

515,

relations

670

561

(1974),

(1832) •

with

Indian

citing

tribes.

Worcester

v.

As a corollary of this

authority, and in recognition of the sovereignty retained
by

Indian

tribes

even

after

formation

of

the

United

States, Indian tribes and individuals generally are exempt
from

state

taxation within

Kansas Indians, 5 Wall.

their own territory.

737 ~ (1866),

In The

for example, the

Court held that lands held by Indians in common as well as
those held in severalty were exempt from state taxation.

10.

• is

It explained that "[i]f the tribal organization •
preserved

intact,

by

recognized

and

the

political

department of the government as existing, then they are a
'people distinct
jurisdiction

from others,'
[the

of

separated from the

State],

and

to

rd · ~

be

governed

cd- 75'r.

~

in

exclusively by the government of the Union."
The

New York

Court

Indians,

characterized

reservation land as

5 Wall.

the

of

state

power,

State's

attempt

~raordinary, ~

'Jd· t.Vf
_,
and

7£0
"an

11

761 ,-=1 10,

0

(1866),

to

tax

Indian

"illegal" exercise

I

unwarrantable

interference,

inconsistent with the original title of the Indians,

·,d ·
offensive

to

their

tribal

General points out, this
views

expressed

Itasca County,

in
426

u.s.

relations) "

~rt

these

the

As

I

and

a.f 77/ •
the

Solicitor

has never waivered from the

cases.

See,

e.

g. ,

373, 375-378, 392-393

Bryan

v.

(1976); Moe

11.

s~

oJv.

Salish

&

Kootenai Tribes,

425

4 75-4 76 ) il976)a...., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,

U.S )

~

411

u.s.

145, 148 (1973).

In keeping with its plenary authority over Indian
affairs,

Congress can authorize

the

imposition of

taxes on Indian tribes and individual Indians.
done

so often,

and

the Court

state

It has not

consistently

has

held that it will find the Indians' exemption from state
taxes lifted only when Congress has made its intention to

~~

do so aes-ohrtely clear.

~

(1930).

The

authorization.

~

Produc~

g.,

Bryan v.

Itasca County,

.1\

a~-393,

supra,

E.

Co.

Carpenter v. Shaw, 280

1924

As
v.

Act
a

contains

result,

Board

of

in

u.s.

such

363, 366-367
an

explicit

British-American

Oil

u.s.

159

Equalization,

299

(1936) , the Court held that the State of Montana could tax

12.

oil and gas produced under leases executed under the 1924
Act. 3
The State urges us that the taxing authorization
provided in the 1924 Act applies to leases executed under
the 1938 Act as well.
Act

is

It argues that nothing in the 1938

inconsistent with

the

1924

taxing

provision and

thus that the provision was not repealed by the 1938 Act.
It cites decisions of this Court that a clause repealing
only inconsistent acts
may

be

acts

on

the

repealed," Hess v.

"implies very strongly that there

same

subject which

Reynolds, 113

u.s.

are

73,

79

not

thereby

(1885), and

3 In British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of
Equalization, 299 u.s. 159 (1936), the Court interpreted
the statutory leasing authority over lands "bought and
acquired by the Indians" to include land reserved for the
Indians in exchange for their cession or surrender of
other lands or rights, as well as that acquired by Indians
for money.

13.

that such a clause indicates Congress' intent "to leave in
force

some portions of

former

acts

relative

to the same

subject- matter," United States v. Henderson, 11 Wall. 652,

A

656

(1870).

The State also notes that there is a strong

presumption against repeals by implication, e. g., United
States v. Borden Co., 308

u.s.

188, 198 (1939), especially

A
an implied repeal of a specific statute by a general on:J
Morton v. Mancari, 417

u.s.

the

sound

State's

view,

construction

lead

to

the

535, 550-551 (1974).
principles
conclusion

of

that

Thus, in
statutory

its

taxing

authority under the 1924 Act remains intact.
The State fails to appreciate, however, that the
standard

~tory

construction do not have their

"'

usual

force

earlier

in

this

cases

involving

Term,

"[t]he

Indian
canons

law.
of

As we

said

construction

14.

applicable in Indian law are rooted

in the unique trust

relationship between the United States and the Indians."

u.s.

Oneida County, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation,
(1985).

--'

Two such canons are directly applicable

in this case: first, the States may tax Indians only when
Congress

has

manifested

clearly

taxation, e. g., Bryan v. Itasca

its

consent

to

County~:~at

such
393;

second, statutes are to be ~ iberallYS construed~ n favor of
the

Indians,

their

benefit,

Commn.,

u.s.

with

411

665,

e.

u.s.

675

ambiguous
g.,

164,

(1912). 4

provisions

McClanahan
174

(1973);

v.

interpreted

Arizona

Choate v.

to

State

Tax

Trapp,

224

When the 1924 and 1938 Acts are

4 Indeed,
the Court has held that although tax
exemptions generally are to be construed narrowly, in "the
Government's dealings with the Indians, the rule is
exactly the contrr r .
The construction, instead of being
strict, is libera . • .
" Choate v. Trapp, 224 u.s. 665,
675 (1912).

15.

~:;~ ight

"" the

of these principles,

it is clear that

1924 Act does not authorize Montana to enforce its tax

statutes with respect to leases issued under the 1938 Act.

IV
Nothing in either the text or legislative history
of the 1938 Act suggests that Congress intended to permit
States

to

issued

pursuant

explicit

tax

tribal
to

consent

indication
implicitly
1924 Act. 5

that
in

the

royalty
that

to

income generated by leases
The

Act.

state

Congress
1938 Act

statute

taxation.
intended
the

taxing

Nor
to

contains
is

there

no
any

incorporate

authority of

the

Contrary to the State's suggestion, under the

5 In fact,
the legislative history suggests that
Congress intended to replace the 1924 Act's leasing scheme
with that of the 1938 Act.
As the Court of Appeals
recognized, Congress had three major goals in adopting the
1938 Act: (}') to achieve "uniformity so far as practicable
~·
Footnote continued on next page.

16.

applicable

principles

of

statutory

construction,

the

general repealer clause of the 1938 Act cannot be taken to
incorporate
clause

consistent

surely

does

provisions

not

of

satisfy

earlier

the

laws.

The

requirement

that

Congress clearly consent to state taxation.
State's

interpretation

satisfy

the

rule

Nor would the
requiring

that

statutes be contrued liberally in favor of the Indians.
Moreover, the language of the taxing provision of

-tev:t.r-

j

~)
~)

the 1924 Act belies any suggestion

bRA~

it carries over to the 1938 Act. 6

The tax proviso in the

by its owH terms,

of the law relating to the leasing of tribal lands for
mining purposes,"
S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1937): (2} to "bring all mineral~leasing matters in
harmony with the Indian Reorganization Act)' [Act of June
~
lgJ4 1 25 tl.S.C. S49l Qt seq ]~ S. Rep./ No. 985,
supra, at 3: H.R. Rep. No. 1872, ac ~ and (~) to ensure
that Indians receive "the gr test return from their
property."
s. Rep. 985, sur , at 2; H.R. Rep. 1872,
supra, at 2.
As the Court o
Appeals
these
purposes would be undermin d
if the
were
Footnote conti ued on next page.
Footnote(s) 6 will ppear on following pages.

~je;.Jed.

75 #...

~.,

3&. S.,s.s . "3.

2

(!9 38

17.

1924 Act states that "the production of oil and gas and
other minerals on such lands may be taxed by the State in
which

said lands

Even

applying

are

ordinary

u.s.c.

25

II

located

principles

§398.

statutory

of

construction, "such lands" refers to •fi/n allotted land • •
subject to lease for mining purposes
[the

1891 Act] • "

construed

•

Ibid.

•

When the statute

• under
is

§397

"liberally

• in favor of the Indians," Alaska Pacific

Fisheries v. United States, 248

u.s.

78, 89 (1918), it is

clear that if the tax proviso survives at all, it reaches

~

~he tax~tion

interpreted to incorporate
proviso of the
1924 ~ct. See 729 F.2d 1193 19 -1198 (~ 1984).
The Court of Appeals
el
that the 1938 Act did
not repeal implicitly the 1924 onsent to state taxation
and thus that this consent conti ues in force with respect
to leases issued under the 1924 or 1891 Acts.
729 F.2d,
at 1200.
Because the Blackfeet have not sought review on
this question, we need not de ide whether the Court of
~peals was correct.
We assume for purposes of this case
that the 1924 Act's authorization remains
leases executed pursuant to that statute.

in effect for

18.

only those leases executed under the 1891 Act and its 1924
amendment. 7

v
In the absence of clear congressional consent to

c-s;;:Gi

l
~ 4
.. sEK ""'f

7we
are
likewise
unpersuaded
by
the
State's
contention that we should defer to the longstanding
administrative interpretation that the 1924 taxing proviso
applies to leases executed under the 1938 Act. The State
relies on various op1n1ons of the Department of the
Interior in making this argument. As the Court of Appeals
pointed out, how,iever, the administrative record is not~ a-strongly consistent as the State contends.
729 F. 2d, at
1202-1203.
The opinions issued prior to 1956 did not
mention the 1938 Act or leases executed pursuant thereto.
Thus, at best, they did not address the issue presented by
this case, but simply assumed that the 1924 Act and this
Court's decision in British-American Oil Producing Co. v.
oar
o
qua 1za
, i!99 u.s. 159 (19J6) ?( applied to
leases executed under the 1938 Act.
It was not until its
1956 opinion that the Department of Interior considered
the relationship between the 1938 and 1924 Acts.
The
Department then held that the taxing provision had not
been repealed by the 1938 Act.
This 1956 opirt~9n was
un ubli ed and did not analyze whether CongressAinlended
the 1924 provision to apply to leases entered 't4~P..der the
1938 Act. A 1966 opinion relied on the 1956 is~uance.
In
1977, the Department reconsidered the issue carefully and
in far ~ ~ detail than it had in 1956, and reversed its
prior decision.
See 729 F.2d, at 1202-1203.
On this
record, i
accept the premise of the State's
argument for defere e to agency interpretation, that is,
that the
had a consistent 40-year practice.
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19.

taxation,
royalty
Act.

we
income

hold
from

that

the

leases

State
issued

may

not

pursuant

tax
to

Indian

the

1938

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-2161
MONTANA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
BLACKFEET TRIBE OF INDIANS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[May-, 1985]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the State of Montana may tax the Blackfeet Tribe's royalty interests under oil
and gas leases issued to non-Indian lessees pursuant to the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, 25
U.S. C. §396aetseq.
I
Respondent Blackfeet Tribe filed this suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Montana challenging
the application of several Montana ta)\es 1 to the Tribe's royalty interest in oil and gas produced under leases issued by
the Tribe. The leases involved unallotted lands on the
Tribe's reservations and were granted to non-Indian lessees
in accordance with the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938,
ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347,25 U. S. C. §396a et seq. (the 1938 Act).
The taxes at issue were paid to the State by the lessees and
then deducted by the lessees from the royalty payments
made to the Tribe. The Blackfeet sought declaratory and in1

At issue are the taxes adopted in the following statutes: the Oil and Gas
Severance Tax, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15-36-101 et seq. (1983); the Oil and
Gas Net Proceeds Tax, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15-23-601 et seq. (1983); the
Oil and Gas Conservation Tax, Mont. Code Ann. §§82-11-101 et seq.; and
the Resource Indemnity Trust Tax, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15-38-101 et seq.
(1983).

2..

g

_

_

,.
83-2161-0PINION
MONTANA v. BLACKFEET TRIBE

2

junctive relief against enforcement of the state tax statutes. 2
The Tribe argued to the District Court that the 1938 Act did
not authorize the State to tax tribal royalty interests and
thus that the taxes were unlawful. The District Court rejected this claim and granted the State's motion for summary
judgment. The court held that the state taxes were authorized by a 1924 statute, Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat.
244, codified at 25 U. S. C. § 398 (the 1924 Act), and that the
1938 Act, under which the leases in question were issued, did
not repeal this authorization. The District Court was not
persuaded by a 1977 opinion of the Department of the Interior supporting the Blackfeet's position, citing contrary views
taken earlier by the Executive Branch. c;
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed in part and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 729 F . 2d 1192
(1984). The court held that the tax authorization in the 1924
Act was not repealed by the 1938 Act and thus remained in
effect for leases executed pursuant to the 1924 Act. The
court also held, however, that the 1938 Act did not incorporate the tax provision of the 1924 Act, and therefore that its
authorization did not apply to leases executed after the enactment of the 1938 Act. The court reasoned that the taxing
provision of the 1924 Act was inconsistent with the policies of
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984,
2

The Blackfeet properly invoked the jurisd.iction of the district court
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1362, whieh provides:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions,
brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recongized
by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
As we held in Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), a suit
by an Indian tribe to enjoin the enforcement of state tax laws is cognizable
in the district court under § 1362 despite the general ban in 28 U. S. C.
§ 1341 against seeking federal injunctions of such laws. See id., at
474-475.

, ., .
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25 U. S. C. §461 et seq. (the IRA). Since the 1938 Act was
adopted specifically to harmonize Indian leasing laws with
the IRA, Congress could not have intended it to apply to
leases issued under the 1938 Act. The court remanded the
case to the District Court to determine where the legal incidence of the taxes fell, and directed the court to consider
whether, if the taxes fell on the oil and gas producers instead
of the Indians, the taxes were preempted by federal law.
We granted the State's petition for certiorari to resolve
whether Montana may tax Indian royalty interests arising
out of leases executed after the adoption of the 1938 Act.
- - U. S. - - (1984). We affirm the decision of the en
bane Court of Appeals that it may not.
II
Congress first authorized mineral leasing of Indian lands in
the Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, 26 Stat. 795, codified at 25
U. S. C. § 397 (the 1891 Act). The Act authorized leases for
terms not to exceed ten years on lands "bought and paid for"
by the Indians. The 1891 Act was amended in 1924. The
amendment provided in pertinent part:
Unallotted land ... subject to lease for mining purposes for a period of ten years under § 397 . . . may be
leased ... by the Secretary of the Interior, with the consent of the [Indian] council . . . , for oil and gas mining
purposes for a period of not to exceed ten years, and as
much longer as oil or gas shall be ~ound in paying quantities, and the terms of any existfug oil and gas mining
lease may in like manner be amended by extending the
term thereof for as long as oil or gas shall be found in
paying quantities: Provided, That the production of oil
and gas and other minerals on such lands may be taxed
by the State in which said lands are located in all respects the same as production on unrestricted lands, and
the Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed
to cause to be paid the tax so assessed against the roy-

,•.

83-2161-0PINION
4

MONTANA v. BLACKFEET TRIBE

alty interests on said lands: Provided, however, That
such tax shall not become a lien or charge of any kind or
character against the land or the property of the Indian
owner. Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codified at 25 U. S. C. § 398.
Montana relies on the first proviso in the 1924 Act in claiming
the authority to tax the Blackfeet's royalty payments.
In 1938, Congress adopted comprehensive legislation in an
effort to "obtain uniformity so far as practicable of the law
relating to the leasing of tribal lands for mining purposes."
S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1938). Like the
1924 Act, the 1938 Act permitted, subject to the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior, mineral leasing of unallotted
lands for a period not to exceed ten years and as long thereafter as minerals in paying quantities were produced. The
Act also detailed uniform leasing procedures designed to protect the Indians. See 25 U. S. C. §§396b-396g. The 1938
Act did not contain a provision authorizing state taxation; nor
did it repeal specifically the authorization in the 1924 Act. A
general repealer clause was provided in section 7 of the Act:
"All Act [sic] or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed." The question presented by this case is
whether the 1924 Act's proviso that authorizes state taxation
was repealed by the 1938 Act, or if left intact, applies to
leases executed under the 1938 Act.

III
The Constitution vests the Federaf Government with exclusive authority over relations with Indian tribes. Art. I,
§ 8, cl.3; see Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414
U. S. 661, 670 (1974), citing Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515,
561 (1832). As a corollary of this authority, and in recognition of the sovereignty retained by Indian tribes even after
formation of the United States, Indian tribes and individuals
generally are exempt from state taxation within their own
territory. In The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1866), for

,•.
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example, the Court ruled that lands held by Indians in common as well as those held in severalty were exempt from
state taxation. It explained that "[i]f the tribal organization
... is preserved intact, and recognized by the political department of the government as existing, then they are a 'people distinct from others,' ... separated from the jurisdiction
of [the State], and to be governed exclusively by the government of the Union." Id., at 755. Likewise, in The New
York Indians, 5 Wall. 761 (1866), the Court characterized the
State's attempt to tax Indian reservation land as extraordinary, an "illegal" exercise of state power, id., at 770, and "an
unwarrantable interference, inconsistent with the original
title of the Indians, and offensive to their tribal relations,"
id., at 771. As the Solicitor General points out, this Court
has never waivered from the views expressed in these cases.
See, e. g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 375-378,
392-393 (1976); Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S.
463, 475-476 (1976); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411

u. s. 145, 148 (1973).

In keeping with its plenary authority over Indian affairs,
Congress can authorize the imposition of state taxes on Indian tribes and individual Indians. It has not done so often,
and the Court consistently has held that it will find the Indians' exemption from state taxes lifted only when Congress
has made its intention to do so unmistakeably clear. E. g.,
Bryan v. Itasca County, supra, at 392-393; Carpenter v.
Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 366-367 (1930). ~ The 1924 Act contains
such an explicit authorization. As a result, in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U. S.
159 (1936), the Court held that the State of Montana could tax
oil and gas produced under leases executed under the 1924
Act. 3
In British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299
U. S. 159 (1936), the Court interpreted the statutory leasing authority
over lands "bought and acquired by the Indians" to include land reserved
8

, •.
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The State urges us that the taxing authorization provided
in the 1924 Act applies to leases executed under the 1938 Act
as well. It argues that nothing in the 1938 Act is inconsistent with the 1924 taxing provision and thus that the provision
was not repealed by the 1938 Act. It cites decisions of this
Court that a clause repealing only inconsistent acts "implies
very strongly that there may be acts on the same subject
which are not thereby repealed," Hess v. Reynolds, 113
U. S. 73, 79 (1885), and that such a clause indicates Congress'
intent "to leave in force some portions of former acts relative
to the same subject-matter," United States v. Henderson, 11
Wall. 652, 656 (1870). The State also notes that there is a
strong presumption against repeals by implication, e. g.,
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198 (1939), especially an implied repeal of a specific statute by a general one,
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 550-551 (1974). Thus, in
the State's view, sound principles of statutory construction
lead to the conclusion that its taxing authority under the 1924
Act remains intact.
The State fails to appreciate, however, that the standard
principles of statutory construction do not have their usual
force in cases involving Indian law. ~s we said earlier this
Term, "[t]he canons of construction applicable in Indian law
are rooted in the unique trust relationship between the
United States and the Indians." Oneida County, New York
v. Oneida Indian Nation, - - U. S. - - , - -. (1985).
Two such canons are directly applicabl~ in this case: first, the
States may tax Indians only when Congress has manifested
clearly its consent to such taxation, e. g., Bryan v. Itasca
County, supra, at 393; second, statutes are to be construed
liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions
interpreted to their benefit, e. g., McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Commn., 411 U. S. 164, 174 (1973); Choate v.
for the Indians in exchange for their cession or surrender of other lands or
rights, as well as that acquired by Indians for money.
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Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 675 (1912). 4 When the 1924 and 1938

Acts are considered in light of these principles, it is clear that
the 1924 Act does not authorize Montana to enforce its tax
statutes with respect to leases issued under the 1938 Act.
IV
Nothing in either the text or legislative history of the 1938
Act suggests that Congress intended to pennit States to tax
tribal royalty income generated by leases issued pursuant to
that Act. The statute contains no explicit consent to state
taxation. Nor is there any indication that Congress intended to incorporate implicitly in the 1938 Act the taxing
authority of the 1924 Act. 5 Contrary to the State's suggestion, under the applicable principles of statutory construction, the general repealer clause of the 1938 Act cannot be
taken to incorporate consistent provisions of earlier laws.
The clause surely does not satisfy the requirement that Congress clearly consent to state taxation. Nor would the
State's interpretation satisfy the rule requiring that statutes
be contrued liberally in favor of the Indians.
• Indeed, the Court has held that although tax exemptions generally are
to be construed narrowly, in ''the Government's dealings with the Indians,
the rule is exactly the contrary. The construction, instead of being strict,
is liberal ... ."Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 675 (1912).
5
In fact, the legislative history suggests that Congress inteoded to replace the 1924 Act's leasing scheme with that of the 1938 Act. As the
Court of Appeals recognized, Congress had three major goals in adopting
the 1938 Act: (i) to achieve "uniformity so far as practicable of the law relating to the leasing of tribal lands for mining purposes," S. Rep. No. 985,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937); H. R. Rep. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1
(1938); (ii) to "bring all mineral-leasing matters in harmony with the Indian
Reorganization Act," S. Rep. No. 985, supra, at 3; H. R. Rep. No. 1872,
supra, at 3; and (iii) to ensure that Indians receive "the greatest return
from their property." S. Rep. 985, supra, at 2; H. R. Rep. 1872, supra, at
2. As the Court of Appeals suggested, these purposes would be undermined if the 1938 Act were interpreted to incorporate the taxation proviso
of the 1924 Act. See 729 F. 2d 1193, 1196-1198 (CA9 1984).

83-2161-0PINION
MONTANA v. BLACKFEET TRIBE

8

Moreover, the language of the taxing provision of the 1924
Act belies any suggestion that it carries over to the 1938
Act. 6 The tax proviso in the 1924 Act states that "the production of oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may
be taxed by the State in which said lands are located . . . . "
25 U. S. C. § 398. Even applying ordinary principles of statutory construction, "such lands" refers to "[u]nallotted land
... subject to lease for mining purposes ... under§ 397 [the
1891 Act]." Ibid. When the statute is "liberally construed
. . . in favor of the Indians," Alaska Pacific Fisheries v.
United States, 248 U. S. 78, 89 (1918), it is clear that if the
tax proviso survives at all, it reaches only those leases executed under the 1891 Act and its 1924 amendment. 7
8
The Court of Appeals held that the 1938 Act did not repeal implicitly
the 1924 consent to state taxation and thus that this consent continues in
force with respect to leases issued under the 1924 or 1891 Acts. 729 F. 2d,
at 1200. Because the Blackfeet have not sought review on this question,
we need not decide whether the Court of Appeals was correct. We assume for purposes of this case that the 1924 Act's authorization remains in
effect for leases executed pursuant to that statute.

We are likewise unpersuaded by the State's contention that we should
defer to the JssssiaDdiRg administrative interpretation that the 1924 taxing proviso applies to leases executed under the 1938 Act. The State relies on 'IZal'ietts opinions of the Department of the Interior in making this
argument. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, however, the administrative record is not as strongly consistent as the State contends. 729 F.
2d, at 1202-1203. The opinions issued prior to 1956 did not mention the
1938 Act or leases executed pursuant thereto. ' Thus, at best, they did not
address the issue presented by this case, but simply assumed that the 1924
Act and this Court's decision in British-American Oil Producing Co. v.
Board of Equalization, 299 U. S. 159 (1936), applied to leases executed
under the 1938 Act. It was not until its 1956 opinion that the Department
of Interior considered the relationship between the 1938 and 1924 Acts.
The Department then held that the taxing provision had not been repealed
by the 1938 Act. This 1956 opinion was unpublished and did not analyze
whether Congress had intended the 1924 Act's provision to apply to leases
entered under the 1938 Act. A 1966 opinion relied on the 1956 opinion.
In 1977, the Department reconsidered the issue carefully and in far greater
7
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v
In the absence of clear congressional consent to taxation,
we hold that the State may not tax Indian royalty income
from leases issued pursuant to the 1938 Act. Accordingly,
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

detail than it had in 1956, and reversed its prior decision. See 729 F. 2d,
at 1202-1203. On this record, we cannot accept the premise of the State's
argument for deference to agency interpretation, that is, that the Department had a consistent 40-year practice. This is particularly true where, as
here, the language and purpose of the 1938 Act are-for the reasons set
forth above-dearly to the contrary.
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SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STATES
No. 83-2161

MONTANA,

PETITIONERS v. BLACKFEET
TRIBE OF INDIANS

ET AL.,

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1985]

delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the State of Montana may tax the Blackfeet Tribe's royalty interests under oil
and gas leases issued to non-Indian lessees pursuant to the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, 25
U. S. C. §396a et seq. (1938 Act).
JUSTICE PowELL

I

Respondent Blackfeet Tribe filed this suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Montana challenging
the application of several Montana taxes 1 to the Tribe's royalty interests in oil and gas produced under leases issued by
the Tribe. The leases involved unallotted lands on the
Tribe's reservation and were granted to non-Indian lessees in
accordance with the 1938 Act. The taxes at issue were paid
to the State by the lessees and then deducted by the lessees
from the royalty payments made to the Tribe. The Blackfeet sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforce1
At issue are the taxes adopted in the following statutes: the Oil and Gas
Severance Tax, Mont. Code Ann. § 15-36-101 et seq. (1983); Oil and Gas
Net Proceeds, Mont. Code Ann. § 15-23-601 et seq. (1983); Oil and Gas
Conservation, Mont. Code Ann. § 82-11-101 et seq. (1983); and the Resource Indemnity Trust Tax, Mont. Code Ann. § 15-38-101 et seq. (1983).
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ment of the state tax statutes. 2 The Trib~ argued to the
District Court that the 1938 Act did not authorize the State
to tax tribal royalty interests and thus that the taxes were
unlawful. The District Court rejected this claim and
granted the State's motion for summary judgment. The
court held that the state taxes were authorized by a 1924
statute, Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codified at
25 U. S. C. § 398 (1924 Act), and that the 1938 Act, under
which the leases in question were issued, did not repeal this
authorization. The District Court was not persuaded by a
1977 opinion of the Department of the Interior supporting the
Blackfeet's position, noting that the Department previously
had expressed contrary views, 507 F. Supp. 446, 451 (1981).
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed in part and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 729 F. 2d 1192
(1984). The court held that the tax authorization in the 1924
Act was not repealed by the 1938 Act and thus remained in
effect for leases executed pursuant to the 1924 Act. The
court also held, however, that the 1938 Act did not incorporate the tax provision of the 1924 Act, and therefore that its
authorization did not apply to leases executed after the enactment of the 1938 Act. The court reasoned that the taxing
provision of the 1924 Act was inconsistent with the policies of
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25
2

The Blackfeet properly invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1362, which provides:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions,
brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized
by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
As we ruled in Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), a
suit by an Indian tribe to enjoin the enforcement of state tax laws is cognizable in the district court under § 1362 despite the general ban in 28
U. S. C. § 1341 against seeking federal injunctions of such laws. See id.,
at 474-475.
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U. S. C. §461 et seq. (IRA). Since the 1938 Act was
adopted specifically to harmonize Indian leasing laws with
the IRA, Congress could not have intended the 1924 Act to
apply to leases issued under the 1938 Act. The court remanded the case to the District Court to determine where
the legal incidence of the taxes fell, and directed the court to
consider whether, if the taxes fell on the oil and gas producers instead of the Indians, the taxes were preempted by federal law. We granted the State's petition for certiorari to
resolve whether Montana may tax Indian royalty interests
arising out of leases executed after the adoption of the 1938
Act. 469 U. S. (1984). We affirm the decision of the
en bane Court of Appeals that it may not.
II

Congress first authorized mineral leasing of Indian lands in
the Act of Feb. 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, codified at 25 U. S. C.
§ 3.97 (the 1891 Act). The Act authorized leases for terms
not to exceed 10 years on lands "bought and paid for" by the
Indians. The 1891 Act was amended by the 1924 Act. The
amendment provided in pertinent part:
"Unallotted land ... subject to lease for mining purposes for a period of ten years under section 397 . . . may
be leased . . . by the Secretary of the Interior, with the
consent of the [Indian] council . . . , for oil and gas mining purposes for a period of not to exceed ten years, and
as much longer as oil or gas shall be found in paying
quantities, and the terms of any existing oil and gas mining lease may in like manner be amended by extending
the term thereof for as long as oil or gas shall be found in
paying quantities: Provided, That the production of oil
and gas and other minerals on such lands may be taxed
by the State in which said lands are located in all respects the same as production on unrestricted lands, and
the Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed
to cause to be paid the tax so assessed against the roy-
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alty interests on said lands: Provided, however, That
such tax shall not become a lien or charge of any kind or
character against the land or the property of the Indian
owner." Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codified at 25 U. S. C. § 398.
Montana relies on the first proviso in the 1924 Act in claiming
the authority to tax the Blackfeet's royalty payments.
In 1938, Congress adopted comprehensive legislation in an
effort to "obtain uniformity so far as practicable of the law
relating to the leasing of tribal lands for mining purposes."
S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937) (hereafter
Senate Report). Like the 1924 Act, the 1938 Act permitted,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, mineral leasing of unallotted lands for a period not to exceed 10
years and as long thereafter as minerals in paying quantities
were produced. The Act also detailed uniform leasing procedures designed to protect the Indians. See 25 U. S. C.
§§ 396b-396g. The 1938 Act did not contain a provision authorizing state taxation; nor did it repeal specifically the authorization in the 1924 Act. A general repealer clause was
provided in § 7 of the Act: "All Act [sic] or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed." The question
presented by this case is whether the 1924 Act's proviso that
authorizes state taxation was repealed by the 1938 Act, or if
left intact, applies to leases executed under the 1938 Act.

III
The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority over relations with Indian tribes. Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3; see Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414
U. S. 661, 670 (1974), citing Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515,
561 (1832). As a corollary of this authority, and in recognition of the sovereignty retained by Indian tribes even after
formation of the United States, Indian tribes and individuals
generally are exempt from state taxation within their own
territory. In The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1867), for
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example, the Court ruled that lands held by Indians in common as well as those held in severalty were exempt from
state taxation. It explained that "[i]f the tribal organization
... is preserved intact, and recognized by the political department of the government as existing, then they are a 'people distinct from others,' ... separated from the jurisdiction
of [the State], and to be governed exclusively by the government of the Union." !d., at 755. Likewise, in The New .
York Indians, 5 Wall. 761 (1867), the Court characterized the
State's attempt to tax Indian reservation land as extraordinary, an "illegal" exercise of state power, id., at 770, and "an
unwarrantable interference, inconsistent with the original
title of the Indians, and offensive to their tribal relations,"
id., at 771. As the Solicitor General points out, this Court
has never wavered from the views expressed in these cases.
See, e. g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 375-378,
392-393 (1976); Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S.
463, 475-476 (1976); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411

u. s. 145, 148 (1973).

In keeping with its plenary authority over Indian affairs,
Congress can authorize the imposition of state taxes on Indian tribes and individual Indians. It has not done so often,
and the Court consistently has held that it will find the Indians' exemption from state taxes lifted only when Congress
has made its intention to do so unmistakably clear. E. g.,
Bryan v. Itasca County, supra, at 392-393; Carpenter v.
Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 366-367 (1930). The 1924 Act contains
such an explicit authorization. As a result, in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U. S.
159 (1936), the Court held that the State of Montana could tax
oil and gas produced under leases executed under the 1924
Act. 3
In British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, the
Court interpreted the statutory leasing authority over lands "bought and
paid for by the Indians" to include land reserved for the Indians in ex3
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The State urges us that the taxing authorization provided
in the 1924 Act applies to leases executed under the 1938 Act
as well. It argues that nothing in the 1938 Act is inconsistent with the 1924 taxing provision and thus that the provision
was not repealed by the 1938 Act. It cites decisions of this
Court that a clause repealing only inconsistent acts "implies
very strongly that there may be acts on the same subject
which are not thereby repealed," Hess v. Reynolds, 113
U. S. 73, 79 (1885), and that such a clause indicates Congress'
intent "to leave in force some portions of former acts relative
to the same subject-matter," Henderson's Tobacco, 11 Wall.
652, 656 (1871). The State also notes that there is a strong
presumption against repeals by implication, e. g., United
States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198 (1939), especially an
implied repeal of a specific statute by a general one, Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 550-551 (1974). Thus, in the
State's view, sound principles of statutory construction lead
to the conclusion that its taxing authority under the 1924 Act
remains intact.
The State fails to appreciate, however, that the standard
principles of statutory construction do not have their usual
force in cases involving Indian law. As we said earlier this
Term, "[t]he canons of construction applicable in Indian law
are rooted in the unique trust relationship between the
United States and the Indians." Oneida County v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 470 U.S.--,-- (1985). Two such canons are directly applicable in this case: first, the States may
tax Indians only when Congress has manifested clearly its
consent to such taxation, e. g., Bryan v. Itasca County,
supra, at 393; second, statutes are to be construed liberally in
favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted
to their benefit, e. g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 174 (1973); Choate v. Trapp, 224
change for their cession or surrender of other lands or rights, as well as
that acquired by Indians for money.
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U. S. 665, 675 (1912). 4 When the 1924 and 1938 Acts are
considered in light of these principles, it is clear that the 1924
Act does not authorize Montana to enforce its tax statutes
with respect to leases issued under the 1938 Act.
IV

Nothing in either the text or legislative history of the 1938
Act suggests that Congress intended to permit States to tax
tribal royalty income generated by leases issued pursuant to
that Act. The statute contains no explicit consent to state
taxation. Nor is there any indication that Congress intended to incorporate implicitly in the 1938 Act the taxing
authority of the 1924 Act. 5 Contrary to the State's suggestion, under the applicable principles of statutory construction, the general repealer clause of the 1938 Act cannot be
taken to incorporate consistent provisions of earlier laws.
The Clause surely does not satisfy the requirement that Congress clearly consent to state taxation. Nor would the
State's interpretation satisfy the rule requiring that statutes
be construed liberally in favor of the Indians.
' Indeed, the Court has held that although tax exemptions generally are
to be construed narrowly, in "the Government's dealings with the Indians
the rule is exactly the contrary. The construction, instead of being strict,
is liberal ... ."Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S., at 675.
5
In fact, the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to replace the 1924 Act's leasing scheme with that of the 1938 Act. As the
Court of Appeals recognized, Congress had three major goals in adopting
the 1938 Act: (i) to achieve "uniformity so far as practicable of the law relating to the leasing of tribal lands for mining purposes," Senate Report 2;
H. R. Rep. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 1 (1938); (ii) to "bring all mineral-leasing matters in harmony with the Indian Reorganization Act," Senate Report 3; H. R. Rep. No. 1872, supra, at 3; and (iii) to ensure that Indians receive "the greatest return from their property." Senate Report 2;
H. R. Rep. No. 1872, supra, at 2. As the Court of Appeals suggested,
these purposes would be undermined if the 1938 Act were interpreted to
incorporate the taxation proviso of the 1924 Act. See 729 F. 2d 1192,
1196-1198 (CA9 1984).
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Moreover, the language of the taxing provision of the 1924
Act belies any suggestion that it carries over to the 1938
Act. 6 The tax proviso in the 1924 Act states that "the production of oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may
be taxed by the State in which said lands are located . . . ."
25 U. S. C. § 398. Even applying ordinary principles of statutory construction, "such lands" refers to "[u]nallotted land
... subject to lease for mining purposes ... under section
397 [the 1891 Act]." When the statute is "liberally construed ... in favor of the Indians," Alaska Pacific Fisheries
v. United States, 248 U. S. 78, 89 (1918), it is clear that if the
tax proviso survives at all, it reaches only those leases executed under the 1891 Act and its 1924 amendment. 7
6
The Court of Appeals held that the 1938 Act did not repeal implicitly
the 1924 consent to state taxation and thus that this consent continues in
force with respect to leases issued under the 1924 or 1891 Acts. 729 F. 2d,
at 1200. Because the Blackfeet have not sought review on this question,
we need not decide whether the Court of Appeals was correct. We assume for purposes of this case that the 1924 Act's authorization remains in
effect for leases executed pursuant to that statute.

We are likewise unpersuaded by the State's contention that we should
defer to the administrative interpretation that the 1924 taxing proviso applies to leases executed under the 1938 Act. The State relies on opinions
of the Department of the Interior in making this argument. As the Court
of Appeals pointed out, however, the administrative record is not as
strongly consistent as the State contends. 729 F. 2d, at 1202-1203. The
opinions issued prior to 1956 did not mention the 1938 Act or leases executed pursuant thereto. Thus, at best, they did not address the issue presented by this case, but simply assumed that the 1924 Act and this Court's
decision in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization,
299 U. S. 159 (1936), applied to leases executed under the 1938 Act. It
was not until its 1956 opinion that the Department of Interior considered
the relationship between the 1938 and 1924 Acts. The Department then
held that the taxing provision had not been repealed by the 1938 Act.
This 1956 opinion was unpublished and did not analyze whether Congress
had intended the 1924 Act's provision to apply to leases entered pursuant
to the 1938 Act. A 1966 opinion relied on the 1956 opinion. In 1977, the
Department reconsidered the issue carefully and in far greater detail than
7
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v
In the absence of clear congressional consent to taxation,
we hold that the State may not tax Indian royalty income
from leases issued pursuant to the 1938 Act. Accordingly,
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

it had in 1956, and reversed its prior decision. See 729 F. 2d, at
1202-1203. On this record, we cannot accept the premise of the State's
argument for deference to agency interpretation, that is, that the Department had a consistent 40-year practice. This is particularly true where, as
here, the language and purpose of the 1938 Act are--for the reasons set
forth above--clearly to the contrary.
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dissenting.
The question is whether the proviso to the Act of May 29,
1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codified at 25 U. S. C. § 398,
authorizes a State to tax oil and gas production under leases
entered into under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938,
ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, codified at 25 U. S. C. §396a-396g. In
my view, the proviso constitutes a sufficiently explicit expression of congressional intent to permit such taxation.
The majority apparently does not rest its contrary holding
on the conclusion that the 1938 Act repealed the taxing authority contained in the 1924 Act. See ante, at 8, and n. 6.
Although the majority d~ not a:epea!:. to come to rest O]! the
question whether the taxin roviso has been re ealed, it is
clear to me (as it was to both the majority and the dissent in
the Court of Appeals) that the 1938 Act did ·not rei:?eal the
proviso. The 1938 Act repealed Orily acts inconsi~ent with
its terms, see ch. 198, § 1, 52 Stat. 347, and there is no suggestion that taxation of mineral leases is actually inconsistent
with any of the provisions of the 1938 Act. Indeed, given
that the 1938 Act and its legislative history are completely
silent on the question of taxation, it cannot seriously be
suggested that the 1938 Act specifically repealed any taxing
authority that might otherwise exist under·the 1924 Act.
JUSTICE WHITE,
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The question thus boils down to whether the taxing proviso, by its terms, ap lies to leases un er the 1938 Act.*
The answeriD.USt be sought in the terms of the proviso itself.
The majority concludes that the 1924 Act cannot be read to
apply to leases under the 1938 Act. I must disagree.
The proviso to the 1924 Act states that "the production of
oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may be taxed by
the State in which said lands are located in all respects the
same as production on unrestricted lands" (emphasis added).
The permission to tax in the • proviso depends only on the
character of the lands on which production takes place; accordingly, the dispositive question here is whether the lands
the Blackfeet have leased under the 1938 Act are "such
lands" within the meaning of the proviso.
The phrase "such lands" in the proviso refers to
"[u]nallotted land on Indian reservations other than lands of
the Five Civilized Tribes and the Osage Reservation subject
to lease for mining purposes for a period of ten years under
the proviso to section 3 of the Act of February 28, 1891 [ch.
383, § 3, 26 Stat. 795]." The 1891 Act, now codified at 25
U. S. C. § 397, allowed mineral leasing of "lands . . . occupied
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same, and which
lands are not needed for farming or agricultural purposes,
and are not desired for individual allotments." Thus, the
proviso by its express terms applies to unallotted lands on Indian reservations "bought and paid for" by the Indians and
not needed for agricultural purposes.
The lands that the Blackfeet have leased under the 1938
Act clearly fall within this description: they are unallotted
*The majority frames the question as whether the 1938 Act "incorporates" the proviso to the 1924 Act. See ante, at 7. To me, the discussion
of "incorporation" seems beside the point. The 1924 proviso remains on
the books, and it covers leases of a certain description. The question is
whether leases under the 1938 Act fit that description. If they do, a specific congressional intent to "incorporate" the proviso into the 1938 Act is
unnecessary.
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reservation lands not needed for agricultural purposes.
Moreover, in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board
of Equalization of the State of Montana, 299 U. S. 159
(1936), this Court held that the Blackfeet Reservation was
"bought and paid for" within the meaning of the provisothat is, the reservation is the product of an agreement by
which the Blackfeet gave up certain rights in exchange for
the reservation. See id., at 162-164. Because the leases
are located "on such lands" as are described by the 1924 proviso, I can only conclude that the taxation of oil and gas
production under the leases is expressly authorized by the
proviso and is therefore lawful.
In so concluding, I a mindful of the general rule th statut are
be liberally construe in avor of Indian tribes.
But more to the point, to my way of thinking, is the proposition that this rule is no more than a canon of construction,
and "[a] canon of construction is not a license to disregard
clear expressions of . . . congressional intent." Rice v.
Rehner, 463 U. S. - -', - . (1983). The proviso to the
19 Act is a clear expression of c n essional intent to allow
the States to tax mmeral pro uction under eases of lands described in the Act; the proviso has never been repealed; and
the lands that the Blackfeet-have leased under the 1938 Act
fall within the proviso's description of lands on which mineral
production is subject to taxation.
Respondents suggest, and the majority seems to agree, see
ante, at 7, n. 5, that this result is to be avoided because State
taxation of mineral production on leaseholds created under
the 1938 Act is somehow contrary to the "policy" of the 1938
Act. The relevant policies seem to have been promoting uniformity in the law governing tribal authority to enter into
mineral leases, preserving the independence of Indian tribes,
and guaranteeing the tribes a fair return on properties leased
for mineral production. But it is far from clear that Congress saw State taxation of mineral production to be a threat
to-either of these goals; as the majority concedes, the legisla4YlV
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tive history is barren of any indication that taxation by the
States was one of the evils Congress sought to eradicate
through the 1938 Act. This omission is particularly striking
given that at the time the statute was under consideration,
this Court had just handed down its ruling in British-American Oil Co., supra, which held that production on leases located on reservations created by treaty or legislation was
subject to State taxation under the proviso to the 1924 Act.
To me, the absence of any comment in the legislative history
pertaining to State taxation confirms that we should give effect to the express language of the 1924 proviso authorizing
the State taxes at issue here.
Finally, I consider it relevant, though not dispositive, that
the suggestion that the 1924 Act does not authorize taxation
of production on 1938 Act leases is contrary to the interpretation of both acts that apparently prevailed in the De artment
oft e nterior until 1977. Op1mons Issue y t e Office ·of
the ~Interior in the years following the passage
of the 1938 Act discussed the scope of State authority to tax
under the proviso to the 1924 Act with no mention of the possibility that the 1938 Act had had any effect on such authority. See 58 Interior Dec. 535 (1943); Opinion of the Department of Interior, M-36246, Oc~29, ~; Opinion of the
Department of Interior, M-36310, Oct. 13, 1955. In 1956, -the Department issued an opinion explicitly ~eluding that
the 1924 proviso applied to leases under the 1938 Act, and the
Department reaffirmed this position in 1966. See Opinion of
the Department of Interior, M-36345, 1\faY 4, 1956; Letter
from Harry R. Anderson, Ass't. Secretary of the Interior,
Oct. 27, 1966, reprinted at App. to Pet. for Cert. A-301.
Not until 1977 did the Department change its view of the
effect of the 1938 Act on the taxation authority contained in
the proviso. This hi~ admittedly does not conclusively
es~ what the Department's position was at the time of
the passage of the 1938 Act and in the years immediately following. Still, it is significant that it was not until years after
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the passage of the 1938 Act that the Department first suggested that the 1924 proviso's explicit authorization of taxation did not extend to leases under the 1938 Act. Had Congress really intended to cut off the State's authority to tax
mineral production on all leases entered into after 1938, it
would seem odd that no one in the Interior Department was
aware of this intention.
Because the proviso to the 1924 Act explicitly authorizes
State taxation of mineral production on "such lands" as are
concerned in this case, and because nothing in the language of
the 1938 Act, its legislative history, its underlying policies, or
its administrative construction suggests that the express language of the proviso should not govern this case, I would hold
that the State taxes at issue here are authorized by federal
law.
I therefore dissent.
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dissenting.
The question is whether the proviso to the Act of May 29,
1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codified at 25 U. S. C. § 398,
authorizes a State to tax oil and gas production under leases
entered into under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938,
ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, codified at 25 U. S. C. § 396a-396g. In
my view, the proviso constitutes a sufficiently explicit expression of congressional intent to permit such taxation.
The majority apparently does not rest its contrary holding
on the conclusion that the 1938 Act repealed the taxing authority contained in the 1924 Act. See ante, at 8, and n. 6.
Although the majority does not appear to come to rest on the
question whether the taxing proviso has been repealed, it is
clear to me (as it was to both the majority and the dissent in
the Court of Appeals) that the 1938 Act did not repeal the
proviso. The 1938 Act repealed only acts inconsistent with
its terms, see ch. 198, § 7, 52 Stat. 347, and there is no suggestion that taxation of mineral leases is actually inconsistent
with any of the provisions of the 1938 Act. Indeed, given
that the 1938 Act and its legislative history are completely
silent on the question of taxation, it cannot seriously be
suggested that the 1938 Act specifically repealed any taxing
authority that might otherwise exist under·the 1924 Act.
JUSTICE WHITE,
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The question thus boils down to whether the taxing proviso, by its terms, applies to leases under the 1938 Act.*
The answer must be sought in the terms of the proviso itself.
The majority concludes that the 1924 Act cannot be read to
apply to leases under the 1938 Act. I must disagree.
The proviso to the 1924 Act states that "the production of
oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may be taxed by
the State in which said lands are located in all respects the
same as production on unrestricted lands" (emphasis added).
The permission to tax in the• proviso depends only on the
character of the lands on which production takes place; accordingly, the dispositive question here is whether the lands
the Blackfeet have leased under the 1938 Act are "such
lands" within the meaning of the proviso.
The phrase "such lands" in the proviso refers to
"[u]nallotted land on Indian reservations other than lands of
the Five Civilized Tribes and the Osage Reservation subject
to le.ase for mining purposes for a period of ten years under
the proviso to section 3 of the Act of February 28, 1891 [ch.
383, § 3, 26 Stat. 795]." The 1891 Act, now codified at 25
U. S. C. § 397, allowed mineral leasing of "lands ... occupied
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same, and which
lands are not needed for farming or agricultural purposes,
and are not desired for individual allotments." Thus, the
proviso by its express terms applies to unallotted lands on Indian reservations "bought and paid for" by the Indians and
not needed for agricultural purposes.
The lands that the Blackfeet have leased under the 1938
Act clearly fall within this description: they are unallotted
*The majority frames the question as whether the 1938 Act "incorporates" the proviso to the 1924 Act. See ante, at 7. To me, the discussion
of "incorporation" seems beside the point. The 1924 proviso remains on
the books, and it covers leases of a certain description. The question is
whether leases under the 1938 Act fit that description. If they do, a specific congressional intent to "incorporate" the proviso into the 1938 Act is
unnecessary.
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reservation lands not needed for agricultural purposes.
Moreover, in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board
of Equalization of the State of Montana, 299 U. S. 159
(1936), this Court held that the Blackfeet Reservation was
"bought and paid for" within the meaning of the provis~
that is, the reservation is the product of an agreement by
which the Blackfeet gave up certain rights in exchange for
the reservation. See id., at 162-164. Because the leases
are located "on such lands" as are described by the 1924 proviso, I can only conclude that the taxation of oil and gas
production under the leases is expressly authorized by the
proviso and is therefore lawful.
In so concluding, I am mindful of the general rule that statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of Indian tribes.
But more to the point, to my way of thinking, is the proposition that this rule is no more than a canon of construction,
and "[a] canon of construction is not a license to disregard
clear expressions of . . . congressional intent .." Rice v.
Rehner, 463 U.S. - - , - . (1983). The proviso to the
1924 Act is a clear expression of congressional intent to allow
the States to tax mineral production under leases of lands described in the Act; the proviso has never been repealed; and
the lands that the Blackfeet ' have leased under the 1938 Act
fall within the proviso's description of lands on which mineral
production is subject to taxation.
Respondents suggest, and the majority seems to agree, see
ante, at 7, n. 5, that this result is to be avoided because State
taxation of mineral production on leaseholds created under
the 1938 Act is somehow contrary to the "policy" of the 1938
Act. The relevant policies seem to have been promoting uniformity in the law governing tribal authority to enter into
mineral leases, preserving the independence of Indian tribes,
and guaranteeing the tribes a fair return on properties leased
for mineral production. But it is far from clear that Congress saw State taxation of mineral production to be a threat
to-either of these goals; as the majority concedes, the legisla-
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tive history is barren of any indication that taxation by the
States was one of the evils Congress sought to eradicate
through the 1938 Act. This omission is particularly striking
given that at the time the statute was under consideration,
this Court had just handed down its ruling in British-American Oil Co., supra, which held that production on leases located on reservations created by treaty or legislation was
subject to State taxation under the proviso to the 1924 Act.
To me, the absence of any comment in the legislative history
pertaining to State taxation confirms that we should give effect to the express language of the 1924 proviso authorizing
the State taxes at issue here.
Finally, I consider it relevant, though not dispositive, that
the suggestion that the 1924 Act does not authorize taxation
of production on 1938 Act leases is contrary to the interpretation of both acts that apparently prevailed in the Department
of the Interior until 1977. Opinions issued by the Office of
the Solicitor of the Interior in the years following the passage
of the 1938 Act discussed the scope of State authority to tax
under the proviso to the 1924 Act with no mention of the possibility that the 1938 Act had had any effect on such authority. See 58 Interior Dec. 5Q5 (1943); Opinion of the Department of Interior, M-36246, Oct. 29, 1954; Opinion of the
Department of Interior, M-36310, Oct. 13, 1955. In 1956,
the Department issued an opinion explicitly concluding that
the 1924 proviso applied to leases under the 1938 Act, and the
Department reaffirmed this position in 1966. See Opinion of
the Department of Interior, M-36345, May 4, 1956; Letter
from Harry R. Anderson, Ass't. Secretary of the Interior,
Oct. 27, 1966, reprinted at App. to Pet. for Cert. A-301.
Not until 1977 did the Department change its view of the
effect of the 1938 Act on the taxation authority contained in
the proviso. This history admittedly does not conclusively
establish what the Department's position was at the time of
the passage of the 1938 Act and in the years immediately following. Still, it is significant that it was not until years after
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the passage of the 1938 Act that the Department first suggested that the 1924 proviso's explicit authorization of taxation did not extend to leases under the 1938 Act. Had Congress really intended to cut off the State's authority to tax
mineral production on all leases entered into after 1938, it
would seem odd that no one in the Interior Department was
aware of this intention.
Because the proviso to the 1924 Act explicitly authorizes
State taxation of mineral production on "such lands" as are
concerned in this case, and because nothing in the language of
the 1938 Act, its legislative history, its underlying policies, or
its administrative construction suggests that the express language of the proviso should not govern this case, I would hold
that the State taxes at issue here are authorized by federal
law.
I therefore dissent.
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The 1891 Act that first authorized mineral leasing of Indian lands was
amended by a 1924 Act that provided that "the production of oil and gas
and other minerals on such lands may be taxed by the State in which said
lands are located." The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, which was
enacted to obtain uniformity of Indian mineral leasing laws, also permitted mineral leasing of Indian lands, but contained no provision authorizing state taxation nor did it repeal specifically such authorization
in the 1924 Act. A general repealer clause of the 1938 Act, however,
provides that "[a]ll Act[s] or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed." Respondent Indian Tribe filed suit in Federal District Court challenging the application of several Montana taxes to respondent's royalty interests under oil and gas leases issued to non-Indian
lessees pursuant to the 1938 Act, and seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. The District Court granted summary judgment for the State,
holding that the taxes were authorized by the 1924 Act and that the 1938
Act did not repeal this authorization. The Court of Appeals reversed in
pertinent part.
Held: Montana may not tax respondent's royalty interests from leases issued pursuant to the 1938 Act. Pp. 4-9.
(a) Two canons of statutory construction apply to this case: the States
may tax Indians only when Congress has manifested clearly its consent
to such taxation, and statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of
Indians. Pp. 4-7.
(b) When the 1924 and 1938 Acts are considered in light of these principles, it is clear that the 1924 Act does not authorize Montana to impose
the taxes in question. Nothing in either the text or legislative history of
the 1938 Act suggests that Congress intended to permit States to tax

II

MONTANA v. BLACKFEET TRIBE
Syllabus

tribal royalty income generated by leases issued pursuant to that Act.
The Act contains no explicit consent to state taxation nor is there any
indication that it was intended to incorporate implicitly the 1924 Act's
taxing aut)lority. The 1938 Act's general repealer clause cannot be
taken to incorporate consistent provisions of earlier Jaws and surely does
not satisfy the requirement that Congress clearly consent to state taxation. Moreover, the language of the 1924 Act's taxing provision belies
any suggestion that it carries over to the 1938 Act, since the words "such
lands" in the taxing provision refer to lands subject to mineral leases
under the 1891 Act and its 1924 amendment. Pp. 7-8.
729 F. 2d 1192, affirmed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J.,
and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST and STEVENS,
JJ., joined.
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JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST and Jus- (
TICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
The question is whether the proviso to the Act of May 29,
1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codified at 25 U. S. C. §398,
authorizes a State to tax oil and gas production under leases
entered into under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938,
ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, codified at 25 U. S. C. §396a-396g. In
my view, the proviso constitutes a sufficiently explicit expression of congressional intent to permit such taxation.
The majority apparently does not rest its contrary holding
on the conclusion that the 1938 Act repealed the taxing authority contained in the 1924 Act. See ante, at 8, and n. 6.
Although the majority does not appear to come to rest on the
question whether the taxing proviso has been repealed, it is
clear to me (as it was to both the majority and the dissent in
the Court of Appeals) that the 1938 Act did not repeal the
proviso. The 1938 Act repealed only acts inconsistent with
its terms, see ch. 198, § 7, 52 Stat. 347, and there is no suggestion that taxation of mineral leases is actually inconsistent
with any of the provisions of the 1938 Act. Indeed, given
that the 1938 Act and its legislative history are completely
silent on the question of taxation, it cannot seriously be
suggested that the 1938 Act specifically repealed any taxing
authority that might otherwise exist under the 1924 Act.
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The question thus boils down to whether the taxing proviso, by its terms, applies to leases under the 1938 Act.*
The answer must be sought in the terms of the proviso itself.
The majority concludes that the 1924 Act cannot be read to
apply to leases under the 1938 Act. I must disagree.
The proviso to the 1924 Act states that "the production of
oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may be taxed by
the State in which said lands are located in all respects the
same as production on unrestricted lands" (emphasis added).
The permission to tax in the proviso depends only on the
character of the lands on which production takes place; accordingly, the dispositive question here is whether the lands
the Blackfeet have leased under the 1938 Act are "such
lands" within the meaning of the proviso.
The phrase "such lands" in the proviso refers to
"[u]nallotted land on Indian reservations other than lands of
the Five Civilized Tribes and the Osage Reservation subject
to lease for mining purposes for a period of ten years under
the proviso to section 3 of the Act of February 28, 1891 [ch.
383, § 3, 26 Stat. 795]." The 1891 Act, now codified at 25
U. S. C. §397, allowed mineral leasing of"lands ... occupied
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same, and which
lands are not needed for farming or agricultural purposes,
and are not desired for individual allotments." Thus, the
proviso by its express terms applies to unallotted lands on Indian reservations "bought and paid for" by the Indians and
not needed for agricultural purposes.
The lands that the Blackfeet have leased under the 1938
Act clearly fall within this description: they are unallotted
*The majority frames the question as whether the 1938 Act "incorporates" the proviso to the 1924 Act. See ante, at 7. To me, the discussion
of "incorporation" seems beside the point. The 1924 proviso remains on
the books, and it covers leases of a certain description. The question is
whether leases under the 1938 Act fit that description. If they do, a specific congressional intent to "incorporate" the proviso into the 1938 Act is
unnecessary.
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reservation lands not needed for agricultural purposes.
Moreover, in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board
of Equalization of Montana, 299 U. S. 159 (1936), this Court
held that the Blackfeet Reservation was "bought and paid
for" within the meaning of the provis<>-that is, the reservation is the product of an agreement by which the Blackfeet
gave up certain rights in exchange for the reservation. See
id., at 162-164. Because the leases are located "on such
lands" as are described by the 1924 proviso, I can only conclude that the taxation of oil and gas production under the
leases is expressly authorized by the proviso and is therefore
lawful.
In so concluding, I am mindful of the general rule that statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of Indian tribes.
But more to the point, to my way of thinking, is the proposition that this rule is no more than a canon of construction,
and "[a] canon of construction is not a license to disregard
clear expressions of . . . congressional intent." Rice v.
Rehner, 463 U. S. 713, 733 (1983). The proviso to the 1924
Act is a clear expression of congressional intent to allow the
States to tax mineral production under leases of lands described in the Act; the proviso has never been repealed; and
the lands that the Blackfeet ,have leased under the 1938 Act
fall within the proviso's description of lands on which mineral
production is subject to taxation.
Respondents suggest, and the majority seems to agree, see
ante, at 7, n. 5, that this result is to be avoided because State
taxation of mineral production on leaseholds created under
the 1938 Act is somehow contrary to the "policy" of the 1938
Act. The relevant policies seem to have been promoting uniformity in the law governing tribal authority to enter into
mineral leases, preserving the independence of Indian tribes,
and guaranteeing the tribes a fair return on properties leased
for mineral production. But it is far from clear that Congress saw State taxation of mineral production to be a threat
to any of these goals; as the majority concedes, the legislative
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history is barren of any indication that taxation by the States
was one of the evils Congress sought to eradicate through the
1938 Act. This omission is particularly striking given that at
the time the statute was under consideration, this Court had
just handed down its ruling in British-American Oil Co.,
supra, which held that production on leases located on reservations created by treaty or legislation was subject to
State taxation under the proviso to the 1924 Act. To me, the
absence of any comment in the legislative history pertaining
to State taxation confirms that we should give effect to the
express language of the 1924 proviso authorizing the State
taxes at issue here.
Finally, I consider it relevant, though not dispositive, that
the suggestion that the 1924 Act does not authorize taxation
of production on 1938 Act leases is contrary to the interpretation of both acts that apparently prevailed in the Department
of the Interior until 1977. Opinions issued by the Office or'
the SQlicitor of the Interior in the years following the passage
of the 1938 Act discussed the scope of State authority to tax
under the proviso to the 1924 Act with no mention of the possibility that the 1938 Act had had any effect on such authority. See 58 I. D. 535 (1943); Opinion of the Department of
Interior, M-36246, Oct. 29, 1954, 2 Op. Solicitor of Dept. of
Interior Relating to Indian Affairs 1917-1974, p. 1652 (1979);
Opinion of the Department of Interior, M-36310, Oct. 13,
1955. In 1956, the Department issued an opinion explicitly
concluding that the 1924 proviso applied to leases under the
1938 Act, and the Department reaffirmed this position in
1966. See Opinion of the Department of Interior, M-36345,
May 4, 1956; Letter from Harry R. Anderson, Ass't. Secretary of the Interior, Oct. 27, 1966, reprinted at App. to Pet.
forCert. 301. Not until1977 did the Department change its
view of the effect of the 1938 Act on the taxation authority
contained in the proviso. This history admittedly does not
conclusively establish what the Department's position was at
the time of the passage of the 1938 Act and in the years im-
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mediately following. Still, it is significant that it was not
until years after the passage of the 1938 Act that the Department first suggested that the 1924 proviso's explicit authorization of taxation did not extend to leases under the 1938 Act.
Had Congress really intended to cut off the State's authority
to tax mineral production on all leases entered into after
1938, it would seem odd that no one in the Interior Department was aware of this intention.
Because the proviso to the 1924 Act explicitly authorizes
State taxation of mineral production on "such lands" as are
concerned in this case, and because nothing in the language of
the 1938 Act, its legislative history, its underlying policies, or
its administrative construction suggests that the express language of the proviso should not govern this case, I would hold
that the State taxes at issue here are authorized by federal
law.
I therefore dissent.
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